

**Near and Middle Eastern Studies
at the
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton:
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**Edited by
Sabine Schmidtke**

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JIHADI WEEPING

THOMAS HEGGHAMMER

In the mid-2000s, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abū Muṣ‘ab al-Zarqāwī, carried out a series of attacks so brutal that he acquired the nickname *al-dhabbāḥ*—the Slaughterer. He bombed the UN headquarters in Baghdad, ordered suicide bombings against Shi‘ite mosques across Iraq, and personally beheaded the American hostage Nicholas Berg on camera with a large knife. The Slaughterer was killed in an American airstrike in 2006, but he is still hailed as a hero today by supporters of Islamic State.

Among fellow jihadis at the time, al-Zarqāwī was also known by another epithet: *al-bakka‘*—He Who Weeps a Lot. “He cried constantly—he was very emotional,” said a former cellmate. A hagiographer wrote, “Shaykh Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi wept frequently, especially when the topic was Muslim women and the rapes they suffer. The brother in charge of his audio statements had to do retakes all the time.” As we shall see in this essay, al-Zarqāwī was not unique in this regard, nor did his comrades mean to disparage him. Weeping is widespread in jihadi groups, and those who cry are respected and seen as better warriors for it. That is because weeping is viewed as a credible sign of devotion to God with no connotations of unmanliness.

Shedding tears is part of the culture of jihadi groups along with other social and artistic practices such as poetry recitation, hymn-singing, and dream interpretation. This domain of militant activity has only recently begun to be explored, and it can help understand why people are attracted to groups such as Islamic State and al-Qaeda. This essay will take a closer look at weeping in jihadi groups as an illustration of what the study of culture can reveal. After a few remarks on jihadi culture in general, we will look at why jihadis weep, when they weep, and how their weeping differs from that of other groups. We will see that militant Islamists have an unusually sentimental internal culture, which suggests emotional rewards play a significant role in decisions to join and stay in such groups.

JIHADI CULTURE

Decades of headline-grabbing violence have left jihadism in need of little introduction. The term “jihadi” is contested, but usually refers to a subset of militant Sunni Islamists characterized by a particularly uncompromising and transnational mode of operation. Today it includes groups such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State, their regional affiliate organizations such as al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, foreign fighters who join such groups, and their active sympathizers. They are usually distinguished from militant Shi‘ite groups such as Hizballah in Lebanon and from Sunni militants waging national liberation struggles such as Hamas in Palestine and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Jihadi groups have different aims and strategies; some concentrate on attacking the West, others on fighting their local enemies, and yet others pursue hybrid strate-

gies. The jihadi movement has grown steadily since the 1980s but underwent a particularly rapid expansion in the early 2010s due partly to the Syria war and partly to the social media revolution. The movement has thus far proved remarkably resilient, and its ability to attract followers continues to puzzle observers.

We know a great deal more about jihadism today than we did on 9/11, but much of that knowledge is limited to two domains: operations and doctrines. The attack histories, organizational structures, and recruitment methods of jihadi groups have been meticulously studied, and we have a good understanding of the movement's core ideas. However, jihadis do many things that are neither operational nor doctrinal. For example, they enjoy poetry, music, graphic art, and films. They perform religious rituals, interpret each others' dreams, and discuss visions of the afterlife. They throw parties, tell jokes, and play sports. They dress in particular ways and have their own slogans and gestures. Judging by available testimonies, these cultural activities fill up a large proportion of life in the jihadi underground.

What all these activities have in common is that they are apparently superfluous; they do something other than fill the basic military needs of jihadi groups. A rebel organization needs weapons and training, but it should be able to do without dream interpretation. It has to communicate an ideological program, but need not do so in verse or with music. As such, the music, poetry, and dream interpretation are elements of a jihadi culture, to use anthropologist Edmund Leach's understanding of culture as the "frills and decorations" of a social group.

Jihadi culture is interesting for at least two reasons. One is that these men are otherwise known for their brutality and cynicism, so there is a striking contrast between the toughness they project outside and the sensitivity they display amongst themselves. The second reason is that these activities appear to defy expectations of utility-maximizing behavior. Jihadis are hunted men; they are sought by powerful security services and dispose of limited time and resources. We should expect them to spend all their time on training and fundraising, yet they "waste" time on poetry, music, and other apparently useless things.

Some years ago, while I was a member at the School of Historical Studies, I began to explore jihadi culture with a view to understanding what exactly it consists of and what it does for its practitioners. That research effort is still ongoing, but in 2017 I published an edited book titled *Jihadi Culture: The Art and Social Practices of Militant Islamists*, which sheds some initial light on the matter. My multidisciplinary team of contributors dealt with seven core elements of jihadi culture: poetry, music, iconography, cinematography, dream interpretation, martyrology, and social practices.

The first thing we found was that the jihadi movement does indeed have its own distinct culture that binds together groups in different parts of the world. Some local variation notwithstanding, it is a truly global culture whose features are as familiar to the Islamic State sympathizer in the Philippines as to the Shabaab recruiter in Minnesota.

We also found the culture to be even richer than expected. The corpus of jihadi poetry, music, graphic art, and films is extremely large with literally thousands of products within each genre. We found certain elements to be more prominent than others. Music—which in the jihadi case is restricted to *a cappella* hymns known

as *anāshīd*—was the most widely consumed cultural product; jihadis listen to and sing *anāshīd* in all kinds of settings and situations. Dream interpretation was also strikingly common. Jihadis believe that dreams can contain messages from God about what they should do or what will happen in the future, and because militants are afraid of missing these messages they discuss the dreams they remember in search of information.

Another finding was that much jihadi art is deliberately archaic in its form. The poetry imitates classical verse, the *anāshīd* follow traditional *maqām* (melodic mode) structures, and the iconography is realist and romantic. This likely reflects these groups' self-perception as chivalrous representatives of authentic Islamic culture.

At the same time, we found that jihadi culture had also become more liberal over time, in two main ways. One is that the movement has adopted gradually more elaborate formats of artistic expression. In the 1980s, jihadis debated whether to even use images or *anāshīd*, whereas today jihadi propaganda is a veritable sound and light show. Jihadi culture has also liberalized by adopting more cultural elements from its archenemies, notably from Sufism (Islamic mysticism) and from Western pop culture. The Sufi influence can be seen in the way jihadis describe martyrs (which resembles the way Sufis describe saints), and in the weeping (a practice long associated with Sufism). The Western influence is visible in the iconography, which incorporates visual themes from computer games and from films such as *The Lord of the Rings*, and in the dress style of jihadis in the West, which borrows from street culture. These adaptations are cultural compromises which suggest that culture must be doing something important for the jihadis, because they are not otherwise the compromising kind.

Another insight was that jihadi culture is relatively orthodox, in the sense that most of its constituent elements come from mainstream Islamic culture. Despite their extreme behavior in the military domain, the jihadis have very few idiosyncratic rites or ceremonies. The main difference between jihadi and non-jihadi Islamic culture is in the semantics: in the message of the poetry, the lyrics of the *anāshīd*, and the content of the dream accounts. Otherwise jihadis do mostly things that also other religious Muslims do. This is counterintuitive, but also potentially useful for understanding the movement's appeal. Other radical subcultures, such as the extreme left or the extreme right, are deliberately modern and often involve a major aesthetic break from the mainstream. Jihadi culture, by contrast, claims historical depth and has a veneration of authenticity that probably helps seduce identity-seeking Muslim youth.

However, the study of jihadi culture is still in its infancy, and much remains to be explored. One of the most striking elements of jihadi culture that has yet to receive in-depth attention is the weeping.

Jihadi weeping is quite easy to study because the militants themselves are not ashamed to describe or even showcase their own crying. We can thus study jihadi weeping through the same sources that we use to study other aspects of jihadi culture, notably autobiographies, martyrdom biographies, jihadi propaganda videos, documentaries, court documents, and interviews with ex-jihadis. Most of these sources were produced to cast jihadis in a good light and must be approached criti-

cally. We can assume, for example, that they overreport “noble” forms of weeping and that they do not tell us how much and why jihadis cry when they are alone.

WHY THEY WEEP

As with many aspects of jihadi behavior and etiquette, there is a basis for weeping in the Islamic tradition. Weeping is mentioned in the Qurʾān several times in positive terms, notably when describing the early prophets: “When the verses of the Most Merciful were recited to them, they fell in prostration and weeping” (19:58). *Ḥadīth* (Prophetic traditions) contain numerous accounts of the Prophet Muḥammad and his companions weeping during prayer, Qurʾān recitation, and grief over loved ones. The *ḥadīth* also contain sayings of the Prophet promoting weeping, such as “Whoever can weep, let him weep, and whoever cannot should fill his heart with sorrow and feign weeping. Surely, the hard heart is far from Allah,” and “One who weeps out of fear of Allah will not enter Hell till milk returns back in the udder.” Here we see two of the central ideas in Islamic thought on weeping. One is that weeping is *generally* good because it shows “softness of the heart,” a central virtue in Islamic ethics that is associated with humility and generosity. The other idea is that it is *especially* good to weep out of “fear of God”; it shows devotion to the Almighty and is taken into account on the Day of Judgment. Thus not all weeping is equal; it is better to weep from fear of God than for mundane reasons.

Although it is not explicitly articulated in their writings, jihadis clearly do consider certain types of weeping as unmanly. We can see it in the way they mock their enemies for shedding tears. For example, in 2015, jihadi Twitter users shared a Youtube video titled “US soldier crying for their life in the battle of Falluja,” often accompanied by sarcastic comments about the infidels’ impending defeat. Similarly in 2015, at the time when Islamic State executed suspected homosexuals by throwing them off tall buildings, a female Islamic State sympathizer posted a picture of one of the victims on Twitter, adding the comment “hahaha poor baby—want a tissue before you go skydiving?” In these cases, they view the weeping as grounded in cowardice or fear of death, which they do not consider legitimate reasons for crying.

Weeping for the right reasons, however, is highly appreciated inside the jihadi movement. As noted already, there are special epithets reserved for those in the movement who weep more than others. Earlier we saw Abū Muṣʿab al-Zarqāwī described as *al-bakkaʿ*, “he who weeps a lot.” In other texts he is called *kathīr al-bukāʿ*, literally “the plentiful of weeping.” Another epithet is *al-bākī*, “he who weeps.” A preacher named Ibrāhīm al-Jibrīn is presented on Youtube as *al-bākī al-mubkī*, “he who weeps and causes weeping.”

Meanwhile, some jihadis struggle to weep despite their best efforts and envy their more tearful comrades. Khaled al-Berry, a member of the Egyptian Islamic Group in the 1980s, complained,

An acquaintance of mine had changed to a startling degree recently. [...] Suddenly this young man started fasting every day and when he came to the prayer, he only had to hear the Qurʾān to start weeping loudly, on one note, like a long cry of pain. I felt that the sound was sincere and contained a suppressed complaint

and I felt that it contained something I lacked. I wanted that sound. I wanted it to come out of me, for if it did so, it would relieve me of many things.

WHEN THEY WEEP

Most reported episodes of jihadi weeping occur in devotional settings or in situations in which a person is being exposed to a religious message. I identified seven ideal-type situations in which jihadis cry for devotional reasons. The first is during prayer. An al-Qaeda recruit described Friday prayer in a training camp in late 1990s Afghanistan:

The al-Jum‘a prayer was always the most intense of the week. [...] Sometimes, a brother would be so overcome by faith that tears would well up in his eyes. I was overcome too. Standing amidst these mujahidin, I could feel the spirit of God fill me completely. I was swept up as the others by the feelings of love and fellowship and brotherhood. I was part of a community, a community of complete devotion to God.

The second is during Qur‘ān recitation. For example, Omar Hammami, a Somali-American who joined Shabaab in the late 2000s, noted about his brutal trainer that “despite his tough appearance, he used to cry in the prayers when he heard the verses of the Qur‘ān recited.”

The third is while listening to *anāshīd*. For example, a video from Islamic State-controlled Syria around 2015 shows a Tunisian singer (*munshid*) chanting a lyrical hymn to a room full of men, perhaps some forty of them. Four or five of them break into tears at successive points during the session; meanwhile, the camera scans the room and zooms in on some of the crying men.

The fourth main situation is when giving a speech or a sermon. There are multiple examples of this, involving both preachers and fighters. For example, in 2015 the Norwegian-Swedish foreign fighter Michael Skråmo recorded a videotaped message from Kobane in Syria directed at friends and sympathizers at home. A few minutes into the film he breaks down crying while talking about the religious experiences he is having and would like his friends to partake in.

A fifth type of situation is upon *bearing* a speech or a sermon. For example, in a video from Syria in 2013, we see the Saudi jihadi shaykh ‘Abd Allāh al-Muḥaysinī give a pre-battle speech, and one of the men next to him, believed to be commander Sayf Allāh al-Shīshānī, tears up at the end of the speech. In another video from Gaza around 2014, the Salafi shaykh ‘Abd al-Laṭīf Mūsā (a.k.a. Abū Nūr al-Maqdisī) gives a speech in a mosque, and some twenty-five minutes into it, one of the guards is so overcome with emotion that he starts crying.

A sixth type of weeping situation is in anticipation of martyrdom. Some cry prior to a battle in sheer excitement, like these Arab fighters in early 1990s Bosnia:

One of the brothers told me that he stayed up at night, weeping bitterly and praying to God to grant him martyrdom in the coming operation. [...] On the night prior to the operation he led us in prayer at night and I swear that he made us cry by the way he supplicated God for victory and implored him constantly to grant him martyrdom.

Others weep when they come out of a battle alive. For example, when the Yemeni fighter Nāṣir al-Baḥrī had to return to base to recover from an injury during a battle in Bosnia, he “started weeping. I felt that in the middle of the war there was no use for me.” Similarly, a Syrian-Palestinian named Tamīm al-ʿAdnānī cried when he was not allowed to go into the battle of Jaji in late 1980s Afghanistan: “Sheikh Tamim began to kiss the hands of Sheikh Sayyaf [the commanding officer], pleading with him to allow him to join the group. Sheikh Sayyaf refused to let him join the group and Sheikh Tamim was extremely upset at that, so he began weeping like a child.”

A seventh and very frequent weeping scenario is when a militant sees or talks about the suffering of Muslim women and children at the hands of Islam’s enemies. The same Tamīm al-ʿAdnānī was described as follows by one of his comrades: “If I ever spoke to him about the tragedies of the Muslims, it was as if those tragedies were happening to him. He would cry much, and was very soft-hearted, emotional and sentimental.” Similarly, a Saudi fighter named Abu al-Zubayr al-Kabili was known for collapsing in tears “whenever he heard of a calamity affecting the Muslim nation or a tragic story that had occurred in Bosnia.” We know such reports are real, because jihadis have been observed doing this during trials; for example, Ishaq Ahmed, a Somali-Norwegian foreign fighter returnee from Syria, wept in court in 2015 when describing an anecdote about a young girl who was raped by al-Asad’s soldiers, a story that he said had motivated him to go. This kind of “weeping for the suffering Muslim nation” is something of a specificity for jihadis as compared to nonmilitant Muslims. Expressing concern for the well-being of Muslims around the world is strictly speaking not a devotional act, but rather a political one. Here jihadis are stretching the notion of devotion to fit their political worldview.

That “politicized weeping” is controversial is illustrated in the following account of a dispute between a jihadi and a nonjihadi Salafi at a mosque in the United Kingdom. It involves none other than “Jihadi John” (Mohammed Emwazi), the British foreign fighter who rose to infamy in 2014 as a black-clad beheader of Islamic State hostages. After his death, the Islamic State magazine *Dabiq* published a eulogy that included this passage:

In one of the [mosques] in the land of kufr, the [non-jihadi Salafi] remarked regarding the abuses of the spiteful Jews against our sisters in Palestine that the women “deserved it.” Abu Muharib [Jihadi John] had to be restrained from hitting this madkhali by other worshippers. [Then] Abu Muharib began to weep loudly. I watched him in his prayer weeping in [prostration] as if he had lost a loved one.

Incidentally, here we see again that even the fighters with the most brutal reputation can be known for their weeping. Thus in jihadi culture, weeping does not detract from a fighter’s perceived manliness. This, of course, sets jihadi culture apart from the more stoic culture of conventional militaries and that of non-Islamist extremists (such as neo-Nazis), who generally frown upon weeping.

So far we have looked only at devotional weeping—the most highly appreciated type—but jihadis also weep for other, “lesser” reasons. There are admittedly few if any reports of crying for very trivial reasons, such as hurting your leg or missing your mother. These are likely viewed as childish or unmanly reasons to weep. How-

ever, there are other situations in which jihadis weep for more personal reasons that are still in the realm of the acceptable.

The most common such situation is when a fellow fighter dies. There are numerous examples of this in the sources. When the abovementioned Tamīm al-ʿAdnānī died in 1989, ʿAbd Allāh ʿAzzām wrote, “By Allah, we have never met anyone like you before, nor have I ever cried over a person the way I cried over you.” Similarly, in late 1980s Afghanistan, *al-Jihād* magazine described Usama bin Ladin’s grief over a dear friend: “[Abu Qutayba] was Abu Abdallah’s [Bin Ladin’s] right hand and loved him like the spring [...] A tank rocket killed three brothers, included Abu Qutayba. It slashed them into pieces. And Abu Abdallah was talking and suddenly when he came to talk about Abu Qutayba, his throat became dry and his eyes became wet.” Likewise, in 2015, a Chechen Islamic State militant named Mūsā Abū Yūsuf al-Shīshānī described on social media the trauma of losing many friends in battle:

But the next thing you know that friend is killed, and you’re in shock. It’s only when you get back home and you’re alone, that’s when they come. All of the brothers, they come and they get inside your head and they start smiling at you. And however hard you try they won’t go away, until they bring you to tears.

Interestingly, the “fallen comrade situation” presents a dilemma for tear-prone jihadis, because the Islamic tradition offers two opposing norms for it. On the one hand, one is not supposed to weep for martyrs, but rather express joy at their death, because they have entered the highest levels of paradise. This is why Muḥammad ʿAṭṭā, one of the 9/11 hijackers, wrote in his will: “I don’t want anyone to weep and cry or to rip their clothes or slap their faces because this is an ignorant thing to do.” At the same time, weeping over a lost friend or relative generally is considered acceptable, and the Prophet Muḥammad is recorded as having done so on many occasions. In some instances, jihadis solve the dilemma by both weeping and celebrating. ʿAbd Allāh ʿAzzām describes a situation in 1980s Afghanistan: “I heard the news while we were in the battle that Ahmed was killed. The Ta’af brothers burst into tears because they knew him since he was young. The youths started to congratulate each other because of his martyrdom and they wished to be in his place.” However, as the examples above suggest, it seems that jihadis have been leaning toward the more liberal interpretation and allowed people to weep over fallen comrades.

While these self-reported weeping episodes are useful for understanding jihadi norms, it would be naïve to think that militants do not also cry for personal reasons at odds with their norms and ideology. However, in the absence of fly-on-the-wall sources it is impossible to know how many jihadis cry alone because they feel homesick or lonely or suffer unrequited love. What we do know is that radicals have been documented to cry for personal reasons when they are no longer in the group. For example, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, one of the two perpetrators of the Boston bombing in 2013, began weeping during the trial in 2015 when his sobbing aunt took the stand in court. We also know that defectors have wept for regret over their past actions. For example, in the documentary *Jihad: The Story of the Others*, Deeyah Khan interviews Abu Muntasir, a British former jihadi recruiter, who breaks down in tears when asked “Do you forgive yourself?” Similarly, the Australian Hamdi al-Qudsi

broke down in tears in court while admitting to having helped many young men travel to Syria.

HOW THEIR WEeping DIFFERS

When compared with non-Islamist actors, it seems clear that jihadis are on the more tearful end of the spectrum. In non-jihadi extremist movements, like the far right or the far left, there does not appear to be nearly as much weeping, although it does occur. In conventional militaries too, weeping is generally not encouraged the way it is in the jihadi movement.

When compared with other Islamist actors, it is more complicated, because they come from the same religious tradition. Generally speaking, religious Muslims consider male devotional weeping perfectly acceptable. Thus we sometimes see political leaders such as the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan cry when giving speeches. It is also common for nonmilitant preachers to weep while giving sermons. And in groups such as Hamas and the Taliban, people weep and get called *kathir al-bukā'*. Still, it seems jihadis weep more.

Nonmilitant Sunni ultraconservatives, so-called Salafis—or quietist Salafis—differ from jihadis in one important regard, namely, that they recommend weeping in private. The jihadis, by contrast, often weep in each others' company and cry ostentatiously, which quietist Salafis do not like. A French quietist Salafi told this author in an interview that “weeping is a private, intimate matter. This thing where you cry during communal prayer and make lots of sounds, it's showing off.” A subset of the quietist Salafis, the so-called Madkhalis, are particularly opposed to showing emotions and sensitivity.

As such, the jihadis have more in common with other branches of Islam, notably with Shi'ites and Sufis (and to some extent the Tabligh movement). In these communities communal and ostentatious weeping is very common. In Sunni Islam, weeping was long primarily associated with Sufism. The medieval Sufi theologian al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) included weeping as one of the ten rules for the recitation of the Qur'ān:

The sixth rule is the rule of weeping. It is laudable to weep while reading the Qur'ān and if this does not happen spontaneously, one should force oneself to weep. This is possible by way of remembering the threats and warnings in the Qur'ān against the sins and failures of man. Should one feel no inclination to weep, then one has full reason to cry over one's lack of grief and tears.

There is a minor difference between jihadi weeping and Sufi weeping in that the latter is purely devotional and apolitical. The “weeping for the suffering of the Muslim nation” is thus a specifically jihadi practice, as is the crying in anticipation of martyrdom. Such differences notwithstanding, it is remarkable that the jihadis should be so close to the Sufis in this domain, because jihadis nominally despise Sufis on account of the latter's many unorthodox practices. This strongly suggests that the weeping is filling a function that jihadis feel they cannot do without.

Why, then, do jihadis cry so much, and why are they willing to emulate their archenemies in the process? Here we are in the domain of speculation, but there are

at least three conceivable explanations, which are not mutually exclusive. One is that jihadism is such an extreme activity that its participants have unusually intense religious experiences, and cry more as a result. This mechanism may be reinforced by a selection effect by which religiously sensitive people choose to join jihadi groups. A second hypothesis is that life as a jihadist—with its exposure to the horrors of war and the constant risk of death or capture—is particularly stressful and that militants find psychological release in weeping. A third hypothesis is that jihadi groups, being under constant pressure from security services, need to select for very committed members, and that weeping serves as a sign of commitment by which groups can screen members. In this hypothesis, weeping is a form of virtue signaling, by which foot soldiers signal their commitment and preachers signal their sincerity. Given that weeping is hard (but admittedly not impossible) to fake, it is a reasonably reliable signal of ideological commitment. When combined with other costly signals, it may be a useful vetting tool. These hypotheses are hard to test, however, so at this point we cannot say for sure why jihadis weep more than others.

What we can say is that the weeping adds to a number of other cultural practices in jihadi groups that involve emotions. Poetry, music, films, and religious rituals are all designed to elicit emotional reactions. Overall, jihadis appear to have an unusually sentimental culture that values expression of emotions and artistic sensitivity more than do many other rebel cultures. This in itself is an important insight into the mind-set and world view of jihadis.

The jihadi sentimentalism also points to a potentially deeper social-scientific insight, namely, that people may join and stay in jihadi groups in part because of the emotional rewards offered by life in the jihadi underground. Thus far, the dominant models for conceptualizing jihadi recruitment have assumed decision-making processes in which cognition reigns supreme. For example, the notion that economic deprivation fuels recruitment rests on the idea that individuals join based on a rational weighing of the relative material benefits of participation versus nonparticipation. Similarly, the notion that Western foreign policy fuels jihadism rests on the assumption that individuals join based on an expectation that their participation will improve the geopolitical standing of Muslims. Even those who stress the role of ideology usually have in mind a cognitive mechanism by which the individual is swayed by the sheer strength of argument in the ideology on offer. It could be, however, that decisions to join or stay are swayed to a considerable extent by more short-term emotional rewards. Put more simply, perhaps recruits join because they find jihadi life enjoyable. After all, it is a life filled with intense emotional experiences: a sense of closeness to God, the thrill of adventure, deep affection toward one's comrades, aesthetic pleasure from listening to music and poetry, and a sense of mystery evoked by the dream world and the afterlife. Herein may lie part of the answer to why jihadism has proved so attractive and resilient.

At a more general level, jihadi weeping informs our understanding of warrior cultures, notably by challenging the preconception that brutality and sensitivity are opposites. Militant Islamists show that the two norms can coexist in a culture that values ruthlessness and sensitivity simultaneously. Of course, this is not news to anthropologists and cultural historians, who know that, historically, many warrior cultures have combined the two, and that the stoicism of modern Western militaries

is to some extent the exception. In any case, jihadi culture remains vibrant, and we have probably not seen the last Slaughterer Who Weeps a Lot.