

FFI RAPPORT

PATHS TO GLOBAL JIHAD: RADICALISATION AND RECRUITMENT TO TERROR NETWORKS. Proceedings from a FFI Seminar, Oslo, 15 March 2006

BOKHARI Laila, HEGGHAMMER Thomas, LIA Brynjar, NESSER
Petter, TØNNESEN Truls H

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Norwegian Defence Research Establishment

UNCLASSIFIED

P O BOX 25
 NO-2027 KJELLER, NORWAY
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
 (when data entered)

1) PUBL/REPORT NUMBER FFI/RAPPORT-2006/00935 1a) PROJECT REFERENCE FFI-I/885/911	2) SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED 2a) DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE -	3) NUMBER OF PAGES 64		
4) TITLE PATHS TO GLOBAL JIHAD: RADICALISATION AND RECRUITMENT TO TERROR NETWORKS. Proceedings from a FFI Seminar, Oslo, 15 March 2006				
5) NAMES OF AUTHOR(S) IN FULL (surname first) BOKHARI Laila, HEGGHAMMER Thomas, LIA Brynjar, NESSER Petter, TØNNESEN Truls H				
6) DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited. (Offentlig tilgjengelig)				
7) INDEXING TERMS IN ENGLISH: <table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; vertical-align: top;"> a) <u>Terrorism</u> b) <u>Islamism</u> c) <u>Security Policy</u> d) <u>Conflict</u> e) <u>Islam</u> </td> <td style="width: 50%; vertical-align: top;"> IN NORWEGIAN: a) <u>Terrorisme</u> b) <u>Islamisme</u> c) <u>Sikkerhetspolitikk</u> d) <u>Konflikt</u> e) <u>Islam</u> </td> </tr> </table>			a) <u>Terrorism</u> b) <u>Islamism</u> c) <u>Security Policy</u> d) <u>Conflict</u> e) <u>Islam</u>	IN NORWEGIAN: a) <u>Terrorisme</u> b) <u>Islamisme</u> c) <u>Sikkerhetspolitikk</u> d) <u>Konflikt</u> e) <u>Islam</u>
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THESAURUS REFERENCE: 8) ABSTRACT In order to effectively combat international terrorism, government authorities need to understand the process of recruitment to violent Islamist or jihadist movements. In this report, the Transnational Radical Islamism Project at FFI presents five working papers, which explore from different perspectives how and why young Muslims are recruited to jihadist networks. The present studies were first presented at an FFI seminar at Oslo Militære Samfund (OMS), 15 March 2006.				
9) DATE 2006-04-20	AUTHORIZED BY This page only Jan Erik Torp	POSITION Director		

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
 (when data entered)

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1 INTRODUCTION

The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) launched its first research project on international terrorism in early 1999, focusing primarily on causes of terrorism, motivations, ideologies, and modus operandi. That project became the first in a series of terrorism research projects at FFI, called the TERRA-projects. This report is a publication by the Transnational Radical Islamism Project, which is FFI's third TERRA-project.

Few themes in terrorism research today are more timely than recruitment and radicalisation processes to radical Islamist networks. There is an increasing realisation that a better understanding of these processes is needed. Recognising and analysing these processes and the motivations that lie behind must be the first step to formulating policies for limiting recruitment to international terrorism. An effective and holistic counter-terrorism strategy must include a targeted policy aimed at preventing radicalisation and recruitment to terror networks.

At a one-day seminar devoted to the issue of radicalisation and recruitment to terror networks, five FFI-researchers from the Transnational Radical Islamism Project explored different paths to global jihad. Their research papers show the multitude of motivations and processes at stake, and bear witness of a number of ongoing research projects on the issues of radicalisation and recruitment. Questions are raised as to how young Muslims are recruited into militant movements, and what processes motivate them to terrorism or to join a holy jihad. Three of the papers are profile-studies, focusing on jihadist networks in Europe, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Petter Nesser offers an in-depth analysis of the background and motivations of members of six terrorist conspiracies in Europe between 2000 and 2005. He identifies four types of terrorist profiles in a typical jihadist cell: the entrepreneur, his protégé, the misfits and the drifters. The typology helps understand the inner dynamic of such cells, and the recruitment modes corresponding to these profiles. Thomas Hegghammer analyses the profiles of Saudi Islamist militants over the past decade. The paper sheds light on both the particularities of Saudi jihadism and its commonalities with jihadist movements elsewhere. Laila Bokhari's paper is based on a number of interviews with current and former Pakistani jihadists, and provides personal impressions of motivations for joining jihadist groups. Brynjar Lia's paper is an in-depth profile of one of al-Qaida's main strategists and thinkers: Mustafa Sethmariam Nasar, better known as Abu Mus'ab al-Suri. Al-Suri has been known in radical Islamist circles for at least a decade, and has held a number of roles for al-Qaida. His extensive work on the future strategies of the jihadist movement, in particular his emphasis on the 'decentralised, individualised jihad', is a roadmap for future generations of jihadists. Finally, Truls H Tønnessen's paper discusses how radical Islamists have reacted to the Danish caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad. Studies on recruitment processes show that symbols of injustices

committed against Muslims and perceived insults against Islam may be used actively in the recruitment to radical Islamist groups. The discussion on the caricatures is an interesting case-study in this regard.

The five papers in this report were all presented at a FFI-seminar held in Oslo, Norway, 15 March 2006. The more than 150 participants at the seminar included government officials, researchers, journalists, policy makers, members of the security services and others.

The papers as seen in this report were intended as manuscripts at the seminar, and should therefore be seen as working papers. The use of footnotes is therefore limited. For the same reason there is no bibliography attached. Most bibliographic references will however appear in the text itself. For more information on the TERRA research project and the publications reference is made to the homepage: www.ffi.no/TERRA.

2 JIHAD IN EUROPE; RECRUITMENT FOR TERRORIST CELLS IN EUROPE

By Petter Nesser, Researcher

2.1 Introduction

In recent years a growing number of young Muslims living in European countries have joined militant groups and terrorist networks. Some of them decided to travel abroad in order to wage Holy War, e.g. in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir or in Iraq, whereas others decided to take part in terrorism inside Europe.

Why and how do young Muslims become terrorists in European countries? Based on my previous research into jihadist terrorist cells in Europe, I believe the answers to these questions are: for many reasons and in different ways. However, such answers do not add much to our understanding of how people become terrorists. Thus we need to identify and map, based upon as reliable data as possible, the various roads into terrorist networks and try to unveil typical patterns of joining such networks.

Only through detailed empirical studies of well-documented cases can we reach more certain knowledge and create a foundation for making more valid generalizations about recruitment for jihadist networks. In the following, I will address the main findings of previous research on recruitment for the global jihadist movement. Then I will discuss whether, or the degree to which, the prevailing theories apply to terrorist cells discovered in European countries. I will do this by surveying the recruitment narratives of people whom I assume can be considered representative of jihadist terrorism in Europe. Finally, I will conclude and discuss briefly ways of countering recruitment for the jihad in Europe and elsewhere.

Before we move on, these are my main findings: My case studies indicate that recruitment for terrorist cells in Europe is somehow more organized and systematic than stressed in the previous research focusing on the broader global jihadist movement. In line with previous research, I find no evidence of a classical top-down recruitment organization/apparatus (recruitment committees and offices).

However, contrary to previous research, I do identify people who can be characterized as “recruiters” for al-Qaida and likeminded groups. Also, contrary to previous research, joining terrorist cells in Europe does not seem to be exclusively a group phenomenon. In my data-material I also find examples of individualism; people who joined by themselves and initiated “terrorist projects” on their own. My analysis indicates the existence of a “culture for recruitment”; implying horizontal patterns of recruitment, in which hard-core, mainly politically driven, jihadist activists with ties to known jihadist groups, quite aggressively reach out to potential recruits through their social networks. Through religious and political discussions they convert and socialize friends and family members into accepting the doctrine

of global jihad and their duty to fight aggression against Islam – and take part in a “project”, a terrorist cell. Further, my analysis indicates a very important role for social and political grievances in recruitment for jihadism.

All jihadist terrorist cells are hierarchical, consisting of leaders and followers. The leader types are crucial to the establishment and maintenance of the cell. Leaders or “entrepreneurs” appear to join jihadist groups consciously through intellectual processes, and mainly in response to political grievances, whereas followers tend to join for a multiplicity of other reasons (for example, to deal with personal problems, out of loyalty to friends, for adventure, etc).

It is hard to obtain micro-level information about the processes leading a subject to join, but the available data suggests that religious and political discussions, based on propaganda disseminated by al-Qaida and likeminded groups, are important factors.

2.2 Patterns of joining the Global Jihad

According to the American al-Qaida specialist Marc Sageman, Muslims who join the global jihadist movement are diverse, but in general quite “normal” people.¹ However, they do have some things in common. Most importantly, they are Muslims, by birth, or converts.

Furthermore, the “global holy warriors” can be divided into three main geographical clusters based on their ethnic backgrounds (South East Asia, Maghreb and The Middle East/Arabia).

In general they come from religiously moderate middle class families. Many of them are married and have children. Many have some level of education, but they are most often under-employed. Although by other accounts “normal”, they do not come across as harmonious people. The recruits appear to have been socially and religiously alienated and frustrated before they joined militant groups. They also appear to have become noticeably more religious prior to joining. In many cases, pre-recruitment personal crises appear to have been a radicalizing factor. However, according to Sageman, grievances (social, political, religious) can only be perceived as necessary, but not sufficient for a subject’s decision to join the jihad.

He argues the decisive factors for processes of joining the global jihadist movement are social bonds and networks such as those of friendship and kinship. The critical factor is the ability to establish a social connection (a link) to the jihadists through friends, relatives and acquaintances, through people subjects trust and look up to.

One of the main theses of Sageman’s study is that there is no or little organizational push from above in the recruitment process. Rather, the push, comes from below, in the sense that sympathizers of the global jihad actively approach militant milieus and want to join. He

¹ Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. Sageman defines joining the jihad as “the decision to go somewhere for training” (e.g. Afghanistan, Bosnia, the Philippines, Malaysia or Indonesia). He says that “formal recruitment took place at these training sites” (Sageman 2004:91-92). He thus differentiates between joining the jihad and formal recruitment for a jihadist organisation (such as the Algerian GSPC, the Northern Iraqi Ansar al-Islam or al-Qaida).

dismisses common notions of an “al-Qaida recruitment apparatus” and professional “al-Qaida recruiters”, who actively target mosque environments looking for youngsters to brainwash.²

Another feature of joining the jihad, according to Sageman, is that recruits join in groups rather than as individuals, and he adds that this contributes significantly to the growth of the movement. The typical recruitment pattern, according to Sageman’s study, involves a group of friends that develop an interest in jihadism. They themselves take the initiative to seek out radical milieus and attend the sermons of radical clerics. Most of the individuals in Sageman’s sample joined in another country than their country of birth. Mosques were the most common place of inclusion into radical milieus. When frequenting mosques, the group of friends comes in touch with a so-called “gatekeepers”, most commonly someone with “jihad-experience” from Afghanistan, Chechnya or other “lands of jihad”. The “gatekeeper” has connections with more organized jihadist milieus, and he can provide the youngsters with know-how about whom to contact and where to go for jihad training and formal recruitment into militant groups.

2.3 Recruitment for terrorist cells in Europe

Jihadist terrorism in Europe in recent years has involved individuals, groups and gangs that were either associated with, or inspired by al-Qaida and likeminded groups.³ The things they said, wrote and did, strongly suggest that they, at the time they committed acts of terrorism, adhered to al-Qaida’s doctrine of global jihad against the USA and her allied nations.⁴

Uncovered jihadi cells in Europe have usually consisted of a diversified group of individuals, encompassing multiple different nationalities and ethnic backgrounds, ages, professions, family backgrounds and personalities. Because of this diversity, it is hard to establish the degree to which, or whether, social background variables matter in the recruitment process.

I have previously argued that it is possible to identify a distinct set of profiles amongst those involved. The cell members played different roles, and displayed different character traits. A typical cell includes an entrepreneur, his protégé, misfits and drifters, and it might seem as if these profiles join the jihad somehow differently.

The entrepreneur and the protégé are often religiously devout idealists who appear to join through intellectual processes and appear to be driven mainly by political grievances and a call for social justice. Misfits appear to join cells mainly to deal with personal problems or out of

² In fact, he totally dismisses brain washing and “mental programming” as means of recruitment. Also, he convincingly makes the case that recruits are not pathologically or socially predisposed to be terrorists because they score similarly on a set of social background variables. The fact that they have things in common does not explain why the majority of young Muslims with the same characteristics do not support or join militants.

³ Their affiliations with known jihadist groups and organizations appear to vary significantly.

⁴ However, this does not mean that they had no connections with, or did not support local jihads in the Muslim world. On the contrary, there is evidence that terrorist cells gathered funds, weapons and forged documents for shipment to local jihadist resistance groups. I have previously argued that the jihadists rarely can be defined as clear-cut global fighters. Most often, there is a local dimension to their rage, at least among those who spent their childhoods and youth in their original home country.

loyalty to other cell members, whereas the drifters join a cell more unconsciously, through their social networks.

The “entrepreneur” plays a crucial role in establishing and maintaining a terrorist cell. The case studies suggest that the “entrepreneur” himself actively recruits his accomplices. He is indeed a “recruiter”. As “entrepreneurs” come across as mainly politically driven idealists, this indicates a very important role for political grievances in recruitment processes.

Jihadi cells in Europe commonly consist of people of many nationalities and ethnic backgrounds. However, they have tended to be dominated by one nationality or ethnic background. A few ethnic Europeans have been involved in support activities for the cells. Both first and second-generation immigrants have participated in the conspiracies. Second-generation immigrants dominate in the cases uncovered after 2003. The level of education varies among operatives. The majority of operatives had low level or no education. Typically, they got by on odd jobs or criminal activities.

However, the most important people, the leading figures of cells, often (but not always) had some degree of higher education, but they dropped out when they radicalized. Some cell members held steady jobs, others were unemployed. Many had criminal records and there were quite a few examples of former drug addicts and drug dealers. Also, many were married and had children. Often, operatives had experienced some sort of personal crises or difficulties in life before they became more radical Muslims. One of the cases surveyed below involved women in more active roles than we have seen previously.

As noted above, the preliminary analysis presented here suggests somehow more systematic recruitment processes than those Sageman describe. Contrary to Sageman, I do find narratives of people who I argue can be characterized as “recruiters”, not necessarily for al-Qaida, but certainly for the European networks of the Algerian GIA/GSPC jihadist organizations. As noted, the “entrepreneurs” of several cells actively recruited their accomplices. Also, there exist examples of terrorist cell members actively trying to recruit people outside the cell and their immediate circle of friends.

Moreover, al-Qaida and likeminded groups do provide general guidelines for recruitment (through booklets or the Internet), and propaganda which have been used in the recruitment of Holy Warriors in Europe, in addition to facilitating training for the operatives in Afghanistan and other places.

Recruits to jihadi cells first interacted with militants, or made a link to the jihad, in the militant underground milieus of European urban centers. Many attended the sermons of radical shaykhs in London, Paris, etc. Often they belonged to more mainstream non-political and non-violent fundamentalist movements such as Jamaat Dawa wa Tabligh and extremist and political organizations such as al-Muhajirun and FIS, before they became involved with terrorists.

The role of this type of extremist movements in the recruitment process is unclear. In general they talk hard, but refrain from violence, but there are examples of adherents who did turn to violence. The fact that known terrorists were affiliated with such movements suggests that they, at the very minimum, facilitate so-called “cognitive openings” amongst potential recruits, making them receptive to the messages disseminated by the groups that call for an armed battle.

One crucial element in the recruitment process is the actual interaction between the recruiter and the recruit, and the discussions that ultimately convince the subject to join the jihad.⁵ It is easier to find information about why people were recruited than how it actually happened. We do not possess enough empirical micro-level information about the communication techniques used by the recruiter.

By analogy, Quintain Wiktorowicz’s excellent study of the al-Muhajirun organization probably provides some genuine insights into processes at play in the recruitment for terrorist cells.⁶ Al-Muhajirun is, by far, a more classical organizational entity than the secretive terrorist networks that operate in Europe. Until 2004, the organization was allowed to operate overtly in the UK, before it was dissolved and banned after inciting violence. The organization is transnational, with local branches spread over the world. It is hierarchical, and structured around committees. Al-Muhajirun operates with formal membership, and members are expected to participate regularly in the movement’s activities, such as meetings, demonstrations and so-called “Dawa-stalls”⁷.

Members of al-Muhajirun were taught how to recruit new members. They were told to approach so-called religious seekers, and initiate discussions about Islam. They were told to address the concerns of the individual, and to be cautious not to scare him away. In a subtle way, they lured the seekers into accepting the ideology and methodology of al-Muhajirun. They advised the seekers to attend meetings of other groups and then come back for discussions.

Of course, there are differences between recruiting for an extremist organization and a clandestine terrorist network. Al-Muhajirun approached strangers on the street, whereas terrorist cells would, in principle, have to recruit people whom they know they can trust 100%, mainly friends and relatives who have a common background. However, there are indications that some of the same techniques were applied. There is a “culture for recruitment”, an inherent, expansive drive to the jihadist movements. According to this culture, convinced Mujahidin will use all opportunities to try to recruit for their cause.⁸

⁵ Michael Taarnby, “Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe”, Aarhus: Danish Ministry of Justice, 14 January 2005

⁶ Quintain Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising*, Muslim Extremism in the West, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers inc, 2005.

⁷ Missionary activities in the public, on the streets, outside mosques, cafeterias, theatres, etc.

⁸ For example, members of an active terrorist cell in Italy visited Norway in the summer of 2004. Most probably, they were hiding from investigators in Italy, Spain, Belgium and France. Although this would create incentives for keeping a low profile, on the contrary, they actively tried to recruit Muslims at a mosque in Oslo for jihad in

2.4 The Frankfurt-cell

In December 2000, three Algerian immigrants and one French-Algerian planned to bomb revelers at the Christmas marketplace outside the Notre Dame Cathedral in Strasbourg. According to German court documents, Salim Boukhari was the “driving force” behind the activities of the cell. Boukhari was born in Algeria. He attended higher education in mathematics in Algeria and went to France in order to continue his studies. He found life hard in France, and complains about being hassled by French police. Later he moved to the UK, where he regularly attended mosques, some mainstream, others radical. In the radical mosques he made friends with people who belonged to GIA and GSPC’s European networks, which had moved their operational bases from Paris to London in response to French counter-terrorism crack-downs.

Boukhari’s new friends showed him videos of oppression of Muslims around the world. He said the movies from Palestine and Chechnya made a profound impression on him. He decided he wanted to become a Mujahid in Chechnya. His friends, some of whom have been referred to as the “group of Abu Doha,” (Abu Doha; a leader of GIA’s and GSPC’s international networks), advised him on how to get to Afghanistan to train. He traveled via Pakistan to Afghanistan and enlisted at a training camp for Algerians in Jalalabad. It appears that he made the journey on his own. He met the other members of the terrorist cell in jihadist camps in Afghanistan.

Thus, it appears that he joined the jihad as an individual, but was formally recruited to a militant group in the camps. The man who appears to have been no. 2 in the cell, Aeroubi Beandali joined in a similar way as Boukhari. He lived as an immigrant in Germany. He was a petty criminal and a drug addict who turned to religion and attended radical mosques. According to his testimony, he formerly “had no relation to religion”, and “lived European style: alcohol, women and hashish”. He claims an Algerian former army officer convinced him to change his life by showing him videotapes of massacres of women and children by the Algerian army during the civil war in Algeria. After this incident he became a religious seeker and attended mosques in search for “the truth”. A neighbor, who was a militant, advised him to go looking for it in the training camps in Afghanistan. He cashed his savings and traveled there via Pakistan and met Boukhari who probably recruited him for “the group of Abu Doha”.

The other members of the cell appear to have been “foot soldiers” in the cell’s operational activities, but one of them, Fouhad Sabour, had been previously convicted for involvement in a terrorist operation in France in 1995. He probably belonged to the GIA networks before he was recruited for Boukhari’s operation cell. The fourth man, Lamine Marouni, had no known record of militancy, but during trial he stood out as a fanatic convert. He had previously lived in a very “un-Islamic” way.

Iraq. Worshippers at the mosque asked them to leave the mosque. The example tells us something about the strength of the recruitment drive.

Both Boukhari and Beandali appear to be politically conscious people with a strong sense of social justice. As for the other two members, less is known. They do appear to be religious fanatics, and socially tied to the Algerian jihadist movement, but I have yet to find good accounts as to how they joined militant milieus in the first place.

2.5 The Beghal-network

During 2001, a terrorist cell mainly consisting of North Africans planned terrorist attacks against American targets in European countries. The cell was headed by the Algerian Djamel Beghal. The French-Algerian Kamel Daoudi appears to have been Beghal's protégé. He was in charge of the cell's communications on the Internet.

Beghal has a long record as an Islamist fundamentalist activist. He was a member of Jamaat Dawa and Tabligh back in 1994. He was a supporter of the jihadist movement in Algeria and he was affiliated with (and probably a member of) the GIA. He also maintained close ties to Tunisian militants.

He moved from France to London and became one of Abu Qatada's students. He was deeply influenced by several radical imams, including the France-based Egyptian shaykh al-Hariri, shaykh Abu Qatada and the Moroccan shaykh Mohammad al-Fizazi.

He maintained close relations with top leaders of the GIA, GSPC, al-Qaida and Tunisian Islamic Fighting Group. Beghal and some of his accomplices viewed themselves as Takfiris (Takfiri; literally one who excommunicates other Muslims as unbelievers). In Leicester, Beghal formed a group of young pro-GIA Algerians who maintained connections with similar groups in France and other European countries. They trained in Afghanistan (in Jalalabad, the Derunta camp) and recruited Muslims in European cities for jihad camps in Afghanistan.

Beghal is described as extremely charismatic, and he was crucial to the conversion, radicalization and recruitment of the members of his terrorist cell, as well as people outside his immediate circle. In fact, Beghal and his followers approached Muslims on the streets outside mosques in London and actively tried to recruit them for jihad. They were feared by fellow radicals because they were viewed as too fanatical.

Other members of the terrorist cell said Beghal converted them, or helped them to convert to Islam. In 2001 Beghal received a mission from al-Qaida's then chief of international operations, Abu Zubaydah, to form a terrorist cell and start preparations for an operation in Europe. He recruited friends and relatives, such as the young intelligent IT-student Kamel Daoudi, the former professional soccer player, Nizar Trabelsi, who had turned to drugs and crime, and Beghal's brother-in-law, the Frenchman Johan Bonte.

Both Kamel Daoudi and Trabelsi were fascinated by Beghal and his knowledge about Islam. Kamel Daoudi appears to have joined through a more intellectual process than the latter.

In his strongly politicized memoirs he expresses rage and a strong hatred against the Algerian regime, France, the USA and her allies, for injustice against Muslims around the world. “My ideological conviction is total”, he states.

Trabelsi became affiliated with the Jamaat Dawa and Tabligh movement whilst experiencing serious personal problems. In the UK he met Beghal, who recruited him to his cell. Trabelsi trained in Afghanistan together with Beghal’s cadre, and encountered top al-Qaida leaders. He boasts about having played soccer in Bin Laden’s backyard. Neither the misfit Trabelsi, nor Johan Bonte, come across as politically motivated people, they appear to have joined mainly for other reasons.

2.6 The Tawhid-cell

In 2002, a group of Jordanian and Palestinians were arrested in Germany for planning terrorist operations against Jewish targets in German towns. The “entrepreneur” of the al-Tawhid cell was the Jordanian Mohammed Abu Dhess. The top-leader of the al-Tawhid group was (and probably still is) the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who later also became the head of the al-Qaida organization inside Iraq.

Together with other militants based in Germany and in Afghanistan, Mohammed Abu Dhess recruited three others for a terrorist cell which was controlled “hands on” by al-Zarqawi from Afghanistan and Iran. The former basketball player, Abu Dhess, emigrated from Jordan to Germany in 1992. He became a follower of the Palestinian London-based radical cleric Abu Qatada in the mid-1990s, and established himself as the leader of a support network for the Jordanian al-Tawhid movement stretching across Germany. This network had ties to similar networks several European countries (including the UK and Denmark).

In 1995 he traveled to Irbid in Jordan and “escorted” his old friend Shadi Abdullah to Europe. The two had previously played together in a band, Abdullah as a drummer and Abu Dhess as a singer. Abdullah first filed an application for asylum in Belgium. While it was pending he developed a serious drug habit. Abu Dhess invited him to Germany where he filed another application. He met the other friends of Abu Dhess, some of whom would become part of the terrorist cell. He continued to use and deal drugs, but in 1998 he converted to Islam and kicked the drug habit with assistance from Jamaat Dawa and Tabligh in Krefeld. He signed up for a pilgrimage to Mecca together with other followers of this movement (some of whom turned out to be militants), and traveled from there to Afghanistan via Pakistan. In Pakistan he met and befriended al-Zarqawi who trusted him because he was a friend of Abu Dhess. In Afghanistan he was formally recruited to the al-Tawhid group, and was told to return to Germany and team up with Abu Dhess for planned operations in Germany.

Shadi Abdullah appears to be the misfit profile of this cell, a troubled character who joined to deal with personal problems and out of loyalty to friends and role models. Another member of the cell, the Palestinian Achraf al-Dagma, was invited to Germany by a scrap dealer who was a radical Islamist and ran an underground mosque in his localities. After living for a while in

Germany as a drug dealer and abuser, he converted and became more extreme, most probably under the influence of Mohammed Abu Dhess and his followers.

2.7 The Madrid-cell

The Madrid-cell coalesced around a 36-year-old Tunisian, Abd al-Majid al-Fakhet al-Tunisi (“The Tunisian”), at the M-30 Mosque in Madrid. Fakhet came to Spain from Tunisia in order to continue his studies in economics in 1994. At first he was an eager student, and lax about religion. During a personal crisis he turned to religion and soon grew increasingly radical. He befriended people belonging to militant Islamist networks in Spain, such as the Syrian-dominated milieu surrounding the al-Qaida affiliated Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas aka Abu Dahdah. He withdrew from society, quit his job in real estate, and spent most of his time in mosques. He married a 16-year-old girl and made her wear the veil, and he started giving religious lectures at the strict salafist M-30 Mosque in Madrid. The invasion of Iraq, and Spain’s participation in the coalition, made him furious, and he reportedly reached out to Moroccan militants and proposed an attack in Spain, preferably using trained fighters from Morocco. He was told that he had to recruit locally, and so he did. He used his position as a religious mentor at the mosque to recruit a group consisting mainly of young, second-generation, Moroccan immigrants to Spain for the cell.

Some time during 2003, the group became more encapsulated and secretive, and moved its activities to a nearby “underground mosque” situated in a car park. In November 2003, shortly after Ramadan, they organized a terrorist cell and started making preparations for the operation. The religious and politically motivated Fakhet was the “entrepreneur” of the Madrid cell, and it seems he was crucial to the recruitment of the other operatives.

His “protégé” appears to have been Jamal Ahmidan “The Chinese”, a Moroccan immigrant to Spain and a drug dealer. The 33 year-old had ties to the Yarkas-cell, and probably the profit from his criminal activities went into funding jihadist networks. Ahmidan also actively tried to recruit other Muslims to militancy. Once, whilst detained in an immigrant deportation centre in Madrid (2002), he set himself up as an “imam” and gathered a group of followers.

The other members of the core cell look like a combination of misfits and drifters, some of whom were affiliated with and had social ties to jihadist individuals and groups in Algeria, Morocco, Syria and in Spain itself.

2.8 The Hofstad-group

Some time during 2002, a militant group dominated by young, second-generation male immigrants to Holland of Moroccan ancestry coalesced at the Amsterdam El Tawheed Mosque. Mohammed Bouyeri, the killer of the moviemaker Theo Van Gogh was a leading personality, and “entrepreneur” in this group. So was a Syrian asylum seeker to Netherlands and Germany, Radwan al-Issa aka Abu Khaled. Bouyeri and al-Issa appear to have recruited and radicalized a group of young Muslims in Amsterdam and The Hague, through attending

sermons of various radical clerics, study circles and secretive meetings in apartments, and through communications and propaganda on the Internet.

Bouyeri grew up amongst Moroccan and Turkish immigrants in an Amsterdam suburb. In his youth he studied accounting, IT, and social work, and acted as a political and social activist in his hometown. He appears to have been genuinely concerned with the situation for fellow Muslim immigrants in Holland, and the situation for Muslims in other parts of the world. He dreamt about establishing a youth centre for immigrants, but failed to obtain funding. Bouyeri was radicalized after his mother died from cancer, and he was inspired by the 11 September attacks in Washington and New York. He was further radicalized after the invasion of Iraq.

He dropped out of his studies, moved to Amsterdam and became affiliated with militants in radical mosques. He analyzed texts by the most important jihadist ideologues, and disseminated jihadist propaganda on the Internet. Bouyeri also wrote a book called “The True Muslims”.

The Hofstad group appears more amateurish, and more “homegrown” than the previous cases we have looked into. However, the young militants shared ideological convictions, met regularly, and issued death threats against Dutch politicians on the Internet in the capacity of being a group.

At the same time, members appeared to have initiated projects in smaller groups or on their own. For example, Jason Walters, Ismail A., and Zakaria T. went to Pakistan and Afghanistan for training. Jason Walters discussed jihad and training with al-Qaida sympathizers on the Internet. Similarly, the teenager Samir Azzous tried to travel to Chechnya to fight in 2002, but was stopped in Ukraine and had to return. Azzous is believed to have made multiple plans for terrorist attacks in Holland. Likewise, Bouyeri is believed to have executed the slaughter of the filmmaker on his own. The group was not entirely male. A few very radical Dutch-Moroccan women also participated in its activities.⁹

2.9 The London-cell

The thirty-year-old Mohammad Siddique Khan was the “entrepreneur” of the London cell. Investigators believe that he was the one that recruited and radicalized the other youngsters of which it was composed. Khan was an educated man who seemed to have pretty much everything going for him, both professionally and in private.

He had a steady job, in which he was given much responsibility. He had one child together with his equally committed social worker wife, and the couple was expecting a second one. The couple seemed settled in every way and economically well off. Khan worked as an

⁹ These women played a far more active role than one has seen in previously detected jihadist conspiracies in Europe. They participated in recruitment and propaganda efforts on the Internet and in mosques, they provided logistical support for the male members of the group, and they even issued death threats on their own initiative against the Dutch-Somali politician and a Member of the Dutch Parliament, Ayaan Hirsi Ali.

advisor, or a “learning mentor” at a local Primary School, and he seems to have been extraordinarily committed to the job, being perceived as a “father figure” to the youth of his hometown. Khan also ran an Islamic bookshop in Leeds, and he established two local gyms in the name of the Kashmiri welfare association and a local mosque with UK government funding. Khan was seemingly an ardent political activist for Kashmiri separatist movements. In addition, according to the press, his name appeared in investigations into terrorist conspiracies in the UK and abroad involving Pakistani militants based in the UK and in Pakistan.

Khan and the young cricketer Shehzad Tanweer visited Pakistan before the attacks, and it has been alleged that they received terrorist training in camps or safe houses controlled by Kashmiri militants with ties to al-Qaida. Khan probably recruited his accomplices at the gyms and the Islamic bookshop. It appears that he made Tanweer his protégé. In addition to going to Pakistan, the two went together on a rafting trip to Wales, most probably in the spirit of “team-building”.¹⁰

The recruitment of Tanweer is a puzzle. He was a handsome, intelligent and successful athlete who dreamt about becoming a professional cricket player. He received good grades at high school and at University. As his mentor, Tanweer was a social activist. For example, he used to volunteer to arrange sports activities for children at a local community center. There is no evidence he experienced social problems of any sort, or that he was exposed to racism.

According to some of his friends, he was not into politics at all and never rallied against the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. However, others talk about Tanweer’s “political and religious transformation” when he was turning 18, growing a beard and praying five times a day, distancing himself from British traditions and behavior and hanging out with Islamist extremists. According to his family in Pakistan, he was inspired by the 11 September attacks; he despaired of UK policy in Kashmir, Iraq and Afghanistan, and idolized Bin Laden.

The other two members of the cell, Jermaine Lindsay and Hasib Hussain, do not come across as activists, although Lindsay is described as intelligent and interested in politics. Hussain appears to fit the misfit profile, a troubled youngster, vulnerable to influences from older militants.

2.10 Concluding remarks

The case studies show us that there are different roads to jihad in Europe. Some people join militant groups through conscious choices and thought-through processes, whereas others join out of loyalty to friends and role models, or come from “jihadist families” that are socially entrenched in local jihadist movements in the Muslim world or their international networks.

¹⁰ According to the UK press, al-Muhajirun arranged religious seminars and physical training for their members in Wales, but it is not known whether Khan and Tanweer traveled to Wales in the capacity of being al-Muhajirun members. The organization has been banned in the UK, but it operates under new names such as *al-Ghuraba* and *The Savior Sect*.

Others appear to join as a reaction to social problems and lack of options. Profiles of individuals also pointed to elements of youthful rebellion and the search for adventure as incentives to join militant groups. Also, the case studies show that although jihadism typically is a group phenomenon, there is room for individualism, in the sense that individuals might join militant milieus on their own, and initiate terrorist projects on their own.

My analysis points to a very important role for social and political grievances in recruitment and radicalization of jihadist terrorists. The mainly politically motivated idealists I label “entrepreneurs”, are crucial for the establishment of a terrorist cell. No terrorist cell will form in absence of an “entrepreneur”. They act as “recruiters” for al-Qaida and likeminded groups, and they convince and socialize young Muslims in their social surroundings into believing that Islam is under worldwide attack, and that they have a duty to defend fellow Muslims in all corners of the world.

In this way, recruitment for terrorist cells in Europe appears to be a bit more organized and systematic than I anticipated. Although there were no examples on classical top-down recruitment by and al-Qaida “recruitment apparatus”, there were almost without exceptions connections between terrorist cell members and more organized jihadist networks. Likewise, the “recruiters” or terrorist cell leaders used the propaganda disseminated by the ideologues of the jihadist movements actively as a means when recruiting their accomplices.

My analysis suggests the existence of a “culture for recruitment”, which implies that recruits are socialized by friends and acquaintances in militant milieus, mainly through religious and political discussions, and “team-building” activities initiated by the terrorist cell leaders. Team building often involves physical training, weapons training/paint-ball, watching propaganda movies, and attending the sermons of radical clerics.

2.11 Countermeasures: some tentative policy recommendations

In terms of countering recruitment, there are both short-term and long-term strategies. Short-term policy measures would include increased efforts to identify and render harmless potential jihad-entrepreneurs by either prosecuting them, or guiding them to find more constructive and peaceful ways to act out their activism. Another important target group are charismatic “gatekeepers” such as radical clerics, “jihad veterans”, and leaders in militant milieus who play a vital recruitment role. A key factor in countering recruitment is to hamper proliferation of jihadist propaganda through the Internet. Dissemination of such propaganda on the Internet has been, and will most likely become even more important as a means in recruitment processes. Finally, one also needs to prevent the establishment of new training facilities and sanctuaries in which militants openly can spread their ideology, indoctrinate new members and socialize them into the jihadist worldview.

As for long-term countermeasures, politically, integration and inclusion of Muslim immigrants in all segments of Western societies are important means in dealing with the social and

political grievances that contribute significantly to the making of extremists and militants. Efforts must be made to secure an open dialogue between Muslim immigrants and Western societies to facilitate cooperation on efforts to keep young Muslims away from jihadist “gatekeepers”. Moreover, as much as possible must be done (political and diplomatic measures and pressures), by all nations affected by Islamist militancy, to settle peacefully conflicts at the local and global levels that motivate young Muslims to resort to violence (i.e. those conflicts addressed by al-Qaida and associated groups, such as Kashmir, Iraq, Afghanistan and Chechnya), and in this way contribute to counter perceptions that Islam is under attack. In essence, the “Global war on terrorism” needs to be fought in ways that do not confirm the ideology of the militants. Accordingly it is important to avoid, to the extent possible, actions and practices that create symbols on “the suffering of Muslims” and “injustices against Muslims”.

3 MILITANT ISLAMISM IN SAUDI ARABIA: PATTERNS OF RECRUITMENT TO "AL-QAIDA ON THE ARABIAN PENINSULA"

By Thomas Hegghammer, Researcher

3.1 Introduction

I am going to talk to you about radicalisation and recruitment of militant Islamists in Saudi Arabia. You know as well as me that Saudi Arabia and Norway do not have very much in common at all, with the exception of oil and clandestine alcohol production. So I will explain briefly why I think this case study is relevant and interesting. First, Saudi militants have played a very important role in the global jihadist movement, and European militants continue to be influenced by radical Saudi ideologues. Second, Saudi Arabia is relevant precisely *because* its society is so different from the European context. By comparing similar social processes in different societies we stand a better chance of distinguishing the culture-specific from the universal. Third, very little has been written about radicalisation and recruitment in Saudi Arabia. In the existing literature, there is a tendency to explain Saudi radicalism by tautological arguments; i.e. the Saudi militants are militant because they are Saudi (the assumption being that the religiosity in Saudi society or the Wahhabi religious tradition turns people into extremists). But the essential question remains: why do some Saudis become terrorists while other Saudis do not?

In this paper I will look closely at the background of the members of "al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula" (QAP), the organisation which has been waging a terrorist campaign in Saudi Arabia since the spring of 2003. I will try to answer two basic research questions: First: who in Saudi Arabia joined the QAP and why? Second: is there anything special about Saudi Arabia as a radicalisation and recruitment context?

I have divided my analysis into five steps. First, I will present a brief history of al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula. Second, I will look at *who* joined the QAP. Third, I will talk about *why* and *how* these individuals joined the QAP. Fourth, I will look at *why* and *how* they went to Afghanistan. Finally, I am going to make a few comparative remarks on Saudi Arabia as a radicalisation context.

The most important points I am going to make are the following: First, Saudi militants are normal young men from relatively varied social, geographical and tribal backgrounds; Second, al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula recruited primarily among brutalized returnees from Afghanistan who had social adjustment problems after coming back to Saudi Arabia in late 2001; Third, the motivations of these recruits for going to Afghanistan in the first place were complex, and that anti-Americanism or terrorist ambitions were not very prominent factors.

Finally, I will argue that the dynamics of radicalisation and recruitment are essentially the same in Saudi Arabia as elsewhere, but the Saudi context presents two major differences: one, the high degree of social acceptance - in important parts of the population - of private participation in conflicts abroad; and two: the non-confrontational Saudi police culture, which enabled terrorist recruiters to operate freely.

3.2 Historical Background

The very first thing we need to do is to describe and contextualise “al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula”. The short version of the story goes like this: In about 1999, the jihadist community in Saudi Arabia started expanding, and a new generation of Saudis went to Afghanistan and trained in Bin Ladin’s training camps. Between 1999 and 2001, Usama bin Ladin established a significant recruitment infrastructure in Saudi Arabia through the intermediary of a person called Yusuf al-Ayiri. In late 2001, after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the Taliban, several hundred Saudis returned from Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia, some of them with specific orders from Bin Ladin to start preparing for a terrorist campaign in the Kingdom. In 2002, Yusuf al-Ayiri built an organisation and made extensive military preparations for a future campaign. Al-Ayiri and his lieutenants amassed weapons light and heavy, rented safe houses across the country and set up training camps in the desert. It is important to note that the purpose of the campaign was not primarily to topple the regime, but to end what the militants perceived as the American military occupation of the Arabian Peninsula. Later, of course, the group would get drawn into a vicious cycle of tit-for-tat violence with Saudi security forces, but the *primary* target of the QAP was always the “far enemy”. Some time in the spring of 2003, the top leadership of the “old al-Qaida” ordered that the first strike be launched, in spite of protests from Yusuf al-Ayiri, who allegedly argued that his organisation was not yet ready. History would prove al-Ayiri right, because after the first large bombings on 12 May 2003, the Saudi police initiated a crackdown which led to the elimination of al-Ayiri himself and many of his top associates. By the late summer of 2003, the network was seriously disrupted and underwent an improvised reorganisation process in the late autumn. That was when the name “al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula” was first used and a clear organisational identity emerged. That was also when the organisation started its extremely professional and successful internet-based PR campaign, which for a long time would make the QAP look much bigger and stronger than it really was. The high point of the QAP campaign was in the spring of 2004, when the militants conducted a series of spectacular terrorist operations against Westerners across the country. However, in the summer of 2004, Saudi Police dismantled the QAP by arresting the main operational leader Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin in June, by raiding the organisation’s headquarters in Riyadh in July, and by capturing the top ideologue Faris al-Zahrani in August. The QAP would never recover from these setbacks, and the organisation is now essentially in tatters. There are very few signs of new recruitment – young Saudi militants prefer going to Iraq.

3.3 Profiling the Militants

Before looking at the profiles of the QAP militants, I will make a few remarks about the information that underlies my analysis. I have compiled biographical data on 240 individuals who have involved in QAP activities in some capacity or other. Fifty-five of these biographies can be considered extensive and relatively reliable; they also largely represent the core of the organisation. The information comes from a variety of different sources: the militants' own publications, press releases from the Saudi police, articles from the local Saudi press, and my own interviews with friends and family of the militants, conducted in Saudi Arabia during several research trips in the past couple of years.

Members of al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula were basically Saudi males with an average age of 28 years in 2003. They came from all over the country, and most regions and major cities are represented in our sample. The most clearly overrepresented region is Riyadh, which hosted over 50% of the militants but only 21% of the overall population. The most important point to note with regards to geographical distribution is that the regions which are commonly viewed as socially and religiously conservative (or "hotbeds of extremism"), such as the central region of Qasim or the southern regions of Asir, Jizan and Baha are *not* overrepresented in our sample. After 9/11, there was a widespread view that the southern regions had produced a disproportionately large number of al-Qaida recruits, because 11 of the 15 Saudi hijackers were from Baha or Asir. My data contradicts this view. Likewise, I do not find that regions considered poor or rural have provided a disproportionately large number of QAP members. The same thing goes for the tribal distribution in my sample. It is often said that certain bedouin tribes, such as the Ghamid, Utayba or Harb, provide unusually high numbers of Islamist radicals, and many have suggested that such tribes have a particularly rebellious or masculine culture which make them prone to Islamist radicalism. I do not agree with such views, because they do not take into account the fact that these tribes are the largest in Saudi Arabia (with members in the millions, according to unofficial figures), nor do they consider the fact that urbanisation and social change have rendered much less relevant the idea of "tribal cultures" as determinants of social or political behaviour.

If we move to the socio-economic profiles, we can see that the majority of QAP militants belong to the middle class or lower middle class. Most QAP members are only educated to high school level or less. Many started university studies but dropped out. Relatively few QAP members seem to have had stable employment. On the whole, the QAP members were unremarkable, in the sense that they were neither society's losers nor winners. Only a handful seem to have been criminals or delinquents. Conversely, only a few came from very rich families and none of them were employed in prestigious professions. Unlike most Islamist groups, there are no doctors or engineers in the QAP. To sum up, there seems to be few distinguishing features in the socio-economic profiles of QAP members that can explain their radicalisation.

However, there is one clear common denominator in the life stories of the QAP members, and that is experience from Afghanistan. At least two-thirds of the 55 individuals in our core

sample had trained or fought in Afghanistan and/or other countries before joining the QAP. In our sample there are clearly two separate generations of Saudi jihad veterans: those who went before 1996 and those who went after 1999. The top leaders come from the first category, but most members belong to the second category. The members of this latter group were in their early to mid-20s when they went to Afghanistan, and have a very similar jihad experience: nearly all of them trained at the Faruq camp in Qandahar, fought with the Taliban on the Kabul front, and left Afghanistan through Iran in late 2001. Keep in mind that most of the Saudis who fought on the northern fronts were killed (notably in the Mazar-e-Sharif battle) and many of those who fled through Pakistan were captured and sent to Guantanamo. This is to say two things; one, that whether someone made it back from Afghanistan or not depended to some extent on luck; and two, more importantly, those who did make it back had been through similar hardships and were likely to have known each other in Afghanistan.

3.4 Recruitment to Afghanistan (1999-2001)

Now that we have portrayed the QAP militants, we can look more closely at the dynamics of recruitment and radicalisation. We shall start by looking at why and how militants were recruited to go to Afghanistan in the period between 1999 and 2001.

First of all, it is important to note that going to Afghanistan was never seen as “joining al-Qaida”. Afghanistan was simply viewed as a place where one could get jihad training and live in a very Islamic environment. There was no awareness among Saudi Islamists of “al-Qaida” as an organisation, there was only a vague conception of “Bin Ladin’s group” and the Taliban. Moreover, many of those who went to Afghanistan for jihad seem to have had a rather vague idea of what they were actually going to do, beyond firing a Kalashnikov. This means that the driving forces and motivations behind the flux of Saudi recruits to Afghanistan in the 1999-2001 period were very complex and diverse.

In dealing with the question of why people were recruited to Afghanistan, I have tried to distinguish between structural determinants on the one hand, and declared motivations on the other. I shall highlight four of the most important underlying factors. One was the continued high unemployment rate among young Saudi males. Another was the renaissance of pan-Islamist nationalism in Saudi Arabia, spurred by the outbreak of the Chechen war in 1999 and the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000. A third factor was the introduction of the Internet in Saudi Arabia in 1999, which facilitated the spread of jihadist propaganda. A fourth factor was the increased interest in the Taliban regime among radical Saudi clerics from about 2000 onwards, and particularly after the controversy surrounding the destruction of the Buddha statues at Bamiyan.

If we look at what the recruits themselves said about the reasons for going to Afghanistan, we find a whole range of factors, which are political, religious or personal in nature. By far the most common political motivation was outrage at the Chechen war. A large number, perhaps the majority, of those who went to Afghanistan between 1999 and 2001 wanted in fact to fight in Chechnya, but were either unable to get there or unfit for fighting, so they ended up in

Afghanistan instead. Another oft-cited political reason for going to Afghanistan was the desire to ensure the survival of the Taliban, first against the threat from the Northern Alliance, and after 9/11, against the threat from the US. I should stress that I have not come across any accounts by recruits who went to Afghanistan before 9/11 and who say their primary motivation was hatred for America or a desire to take part in an international terrorist operation. While some may have harboured such motivations from the outset, most recruits seem to have developed such ambitions only once they came to the training camps.

Perhaps equally important as the political factors was genuine religious conviction. Many went to Afghanistan on the urging of religious scholars who told them that Taliban was the only true Islamic state in the world, and that they should go and “see for themselves” what such a state looks like. Many others went specifically to train and fight so that they could meet the individual obligation of jihad and their desire for martyrdom.

Personal motivations were also undoubtedly very important. There are several accounts of people who went to Afghanistan to follow in the footsteps of a brother or a friend who had gone before them. Others went because their brother had fallen in combat in Afghanistan and they wanted to die a martyr so that they could be with their dead brother in heaven. Others again went to Afghanistan for totally different reasons, with no intentions to join the training camps, but were drawn into the jihadist community there by coincidence or social pressure.

So to the question of *how* people were recruited to Afghanistan: In the study of terrorist recruitment, a distinction is often made between so-called “top-down” and “bottom-up” recruitment, the first referring to the enlisting of initially sceptical recruits by an appointed recruiter, and the latter referring to the process by which self-radicalised recruits seek out, by their own initiative, an essentially passive recruiter or “gatekeeper”. I shall add another category of recruitment patterns, which I shall call horizontal recruitment. By this I refer to the situations in which there is mobilisation to activism, but where the new recruit is on the same level – in terms of power and initiation to an organisation - as his comrades. This category helps conceptualise the processes which occur when organisational structures are unclear.

Recruitment to Afghanistan was mostly horizontal. The available sources point to the extraordinary importance of social networks in mobilising people to go to Afghanistan. Many of those who went to Afghanistan had a relative or a friend who had gone previously. Most people made the travel preparations as well as the journey itself together with friends or relatives. In some cases, political and religious motivations seem to have been completely subordinate to group dynamics and peer pressure.

This is not to say that there was no top-down recruitment. Recruiters were active in schools. They would invite pupils to evening lectures and social gatherings and give them pamphlets to read. Then they would show jihad videos from Bosnia, Chechnya and elsewhere, and thus motivate people to travel to Afghanistan. There were also recruiters in Mecca, who were particularly active during the pilgrimage or the last ten days of Ramadan, when many young

Saudis go to the Holy City. Radical imams and scholars also played a very important role. Many of them encouraged their students to go to Afghanistan. It must be noted, however, that the clerics seem to have been more interested in helping the Taliban than Bin Ladin.

There are also examples of bottom-up recruitment, i.e. people volunteering to go to Afghanistan without having been encouraged by a recruiter or inspired by their friends or relatives. There are several examples of people who are described in the jihadist literature as being non-observant, but as having a long-standing “interest in jihad and the Mujahidin”. It seems that many were attracted to the masculine, military dimension of jihad training, without necessarily being very religious. Another type of self-radicalisation came in the form of spontaneous reaction to political events. There are accounts of people watching TV images from Chechnya in 1999 and deciding almost on the spot to travel abroad for jihad. Some also seem to have developed a desire to go to Afghanistan after various kinds of religious revelations, often in the form of a dream. It is worth noting that dreams play a very important role in the lives of religious Saudis in general, and among jihadists in particular.

3.5 Recruitment to al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula (2002-2004)

Now we shall look at why and how people were recruited to the organisation al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula. Those who were recruited to the QAP in 2002 shared a certain number of “vulnerabilities” which help us understand their recruitment. As mentioned, many of them were so-called Afghan Arabs who had been brutalised and indoctrinated in training camps and combat. Moreover, many of the returnees had problems reintegrating into society, not only because they were radicalised, but also because their absence had marginalised them economically. Most of them were also arrested and interrogated by police upon their return from Afghanistan. The arrests had a very strong impact on the returnees, less because they were treated harshly, and more because they felt betrayed by the state and society. Faced with adaptation problems, many of them socialised mostly with their friends from Afghanistan, who were in a similar situation. Hence the jihadist social networks were reinforced, and it became more difficult to go back to their pre-Afghanistan existence.

The more explicit motivations for joining the QAP were essentially of three types. Some seemed to be driven more by *politics*. They argued that the Arabian Peninsula needed to be liberated from US occupation, and that the US military had to be deterred from using airbases in Saudi Arabia for the bombing of Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq. Others emphasised the *religious* dimension, quoting the injunction by the Prophet that “there not be two religions on the Arabian Peninsula”, or the need to “expel the polytheists from the Arabian Peninsula”. Many were undoubtedly driven by a strong belief in the necessity of performing jihad (in the military sense), as well as a genuine belief in, and desire for, martyrdom. But there were also *personal* motives. Many referred to the fact that they had sworn an oath together with their friends as they left Afghanistan in late 2001 to liberate the Arabian Peninsula. It also seems that some were angered by seeing friends or relatives arrested by Police as the authorities started cracking down on the jihadists communities in late 2002.

Recruitment to the QAP was mostly a top-down process, in the sense that it was organised and coordinated by individuals who had a higher “level of initiation” than the recruits. Yusuf al-Ayiri presided over a hierarchical recruitment network which systematically targeted returnees from Afghanistan. Their task was facilitated by the existence of social networks linking most Afghanistan veterans. Typically, the recruiter and the recruit would meet at informal gatherings in private homes. Then the recruiter would invite the recruit to smaller gatherings or one-to-one conversations in order to assess his motivation and qualifications. If the recruit was promising, he would be introduced to the recruiter’s superior who would decide on how to integrate the recruit in the organisation. Another recruitment channel was the religious scholars. In 2002, there was a polarisation of the Islamist field in Saudi Arabia, and the discourse of the most radical shaykhs became markedly more violent and anti-American. The most prominent of these, such as Nasir al-Fahd and Ali al-Khudayr, probably only played an indirect role in recruitment to the QAP. However, other scholars, notably Sulayman al-Ulwan, played a direct and active role in recruiting members to the QAP. In addition to being an influential scholar, he was the brother-in-law of Yusuf al-Ayiri.

There were also other – horisontal – ways into the QAP. For example, in 2002, a number of groups of friends independently formed “proto-organisations” that were planning to carry out terrorist attacks in 2002. Some of them were well underway when they came into contact with the QAP network, who told them to put their operation on hold and rather discuss ways of cooperation. Another type of horisontal recruitment was the way in which former jihadists offered assistance (money or shelter) to old friends who were being sought by police for involvement in the QAP. Hence they gradually became drawn into the organisation, but more as a result of mutual affection rather than calculating recruitment efforts.

There are also a few interesting examples of individuals who radicalised almost on their own in 2002, and only joined the organisation after carrying out their own small attacks and becoming fugitives. There are also indications that the QAP’s massive Internet-based media campaign from late 2003 onwards inspired some individuals and groups of friends to contact the militants via the Internet and offering to help. These volunteers were neither numerous nor well-trained enough to make much difference to the fate of the QAP.

3.6 Comparative Observations

Before I conclude my talk, I would just like to make a couple of observations regarding radicalisation in Saudi Arabia in comparison with other contexts. The first one regards the profiles of the militants. As we have seen, QAP members come from quite varied backgrounds and cannot be linked to a particular segment of the population. As such, they are different from certain militant groups in Egypt, who were drawn from quite a specific part of the population (recently urbanized engineering and medical students). In fact, QAP militants are more reminiscent of members of groups that are involved in nationalist-separatist struggles (HAMAS, ETA etc), who tend to have more varied member profiles, because they have support from a larger part of the population. The varied QAP profiles probably reflect the fact that in Saudi Arabia, going to Afghanistan was seen by significant parts of the population as an

entirely legitimate enterprise. It also supports the hypothesis that militant Islamism in Saudi Arabia is not primarily driven by socio-revolutionary thought, but rather by a broadly based *pan-Islamist nationalism*.

The second remark regards the recruitment patterns in Saudi Arabia. One of the most remarkable aspects about the story of al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula is the freedom in which it was allowed to operate in 2002 and early 2003. It is now well documented that Bin Ladin's deputies were recruiting aggressively, systematically and openly, in a way which would have been impossible in most other countries in the Middle East and certainly in Europe. This had probably less to do with the intentions of the Saudi state or the loyalty of the police force, and more to do with the *culture of policing*. Saudi police and security forces have lacked a culture of firm, confrontational and intrusive policing necessary to deal with terrorist groups.

3.7 Concluding remarks

In conclusion, I will simply repeat my four main points, namely: first, that Saudi militants are normal young men from relatively varied social, geographical and tribal backgrounds; second, that al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula recruited primarily among brutalized returnees from Afghanistan who had social adjustment problems after coming back to Saudi Arabia in late 2001; third, that the motivations of these recruits for going to Afghanistan in the first place were complex, and that anti-americanism or terrorist ambitions were not very prominent factors. Finally, the dynamics of radicalisation and recruitment seem to be essentially the same in Saudi Arabia as elsewhere, but the Saudi context presents two major differences: one, the high degree of social acceptance - in important parts of the population - of private participation in conflicts abroad; and two: the non-confrontational Saudi police culture which enabled terrorist recruiters to operate freely.

4 “PATHS TO JIHAD – FACES OF TERRORISM”: INTERVIEWS WITHIN RADICAL ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS IN PAKISTAN

By Laila Bokhari, Researcher

4.1 Introduction

In 2003 I visited Pakistan and met a man who claimed to be a former *Lashkar-e-Tayyiba* member.¹¹ He said: “My only struggle, my only jihad today, is to spread the message that the real struggle is not with a weapon in hand, but to teach the real words of the Holy Qu’ran.” However, some see this very differently. Some are convinced that: “My struggle, my jihad, is to tell you, my sister, the right way.”¹² Others see jihad as a legitimate struggle with all means necessary: “We all have our jihad – it depends what you are chosen for – but if the cause is for God – all means may be necessary”.¹³

This presentation is based on in-depth interviews conducted in connection with a book project I am currently working on. Through in-depth interviews in radical Islamist circles I aim to gain a better understanding of what the different factors for joining a jihad may be. What are the motivations, and what makes violent jihad a legitimate approach for some people? The working title of the book is: “Paths to Jihad – Faces of Terrorism” (Veier til Jihad – Terrorismens mange ansikter). It is due to be published with Cappelen Forlag, Oslo, autumn/winter 2006.

Importantly, here I am looking at *violent* radical Islamists. At some point during the interviewed person’s life he or she has had the conviction that picking up a weapon, whether him/herself, or others, is the right way of jihad. Today, some have changed their minds, while others are in the “formation process” – the process of radicalisation. Some are – or have been – leaders, some motivators, some “connectors” and some “foot-soldiers”.¹⁴

The political setting in Pakistan is key to understanding the rise of jihadi groups in the country. Historically, Pakistan served as the key channel for the transmission of resources to the Mujahidin resistance during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Its *madrasas* have allegedly nurtured the backbone of what was to become the Taliban, and from the mid-1990s until 2001 Pakistan supported the Taliban regime. Pakistan also struggles with severe Shiite-Sunni sectarian conflicts, and it is heavily affected by the ongoing Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, especially the border regions where the popular sympathy for the Talebans is

¹¹ *Lashkar-e-Tayyiba* is the armed wing of the Pakistan-based Sunni-religious organisation, *Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad*.

¹² Case A.B.

¹³ Case A.H.2.

¹⁴ I use the term “connector” to mean the one who has introduced a person to an organisation or network. The term “foot-soldiers” is a general term meaning the various individuals that operate at the ground-level.

high. Finally, Pakistan has its conflict with India over the issue of Kashmir. Since its birth in 1947 Pakistan has had a constant struggle with itself about how being an Islamic state should influence its own identity as a state and its policies. Today, Pakistan finds itself at the forefront in the US-led “Global War on Terror” as a close ally to the USA, which, in turn, has deepened cleavages in the Pakistani political landscape.

Much of the academic work undertaken on radical Islamism and terrorism in Pakistan (including my own work on radical Islamism in Pakistan and Kashmir) has focused on the historical and political context, the groups’ infrastructure, ideology, development and choice of targets.¹⁵ With this study I hope to explore “the individual level” of Pakistani jihadism through interviews with individuals and to have them tell me their “stories”. What processes and dynamics make individuals join radical movements, what is their reasoning, what happens, how and why?

The processes of socialisation and education have been seen by many as being crucial. Leaders, trainers and educators may have a certain amount of influence on the individual. The interviews conducted are both with *leaders* who may see their roles as being to legitimise, convince and educate, and also with *individual* men and women who have taken part in some way or other in the struggle.

There are some characteristics which should be underlined with regard to the cases. Historically, there has been a relatively high degree of social acceptance for “jihad” (as defined by the jihadi groups) in Pakistani society. The country’s history with Afghanistan, the jihadist politics of President Zia ul-Haq and the centrality of Kashmir in its policies, may offer some explanation for this fact. The recent shift with the Musharraf-led Government being a close ally to “the greatest Satan” (i.e. USA) is, arguably, uniting the opposition and the religious groups – emphasising the acceptance of a need to “have your voice heard”. However, the definition of legitimate means in jihad is quite different and is explored in the interviews.

The question of legitimisation is explored in most of the interviews. Where does the person find his or her legitimisation and justification for the chosen path? Some go back to their childhoods, their family ties and societal settings; others say it is the meeting with religion which provides them with a fundamental cause. For some of the mothers of the martyrs religion gives them a strong sense of justification and a glorification of their sons as martyrs. Most of the people I have met readily share their argument for acceptance. However, others have come to violent jihad as a way to seek adventure or to prove their manhood. Answering the question as to whom one is doing it for, surprisingly the answer is a mix of “my country”, “my parents” and “my religion”. This reveals a sense of mixed motivations for different purposes.

¹⁵ Laila Bokhari, *Radikal Islamisme i Pakistan og Kashmir - fra lokal til global jihad?* FFI/RAPPORT-2004/01583, <http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2004/01583.pdf>

4.2 A methodological note

This study is based on interviews conducted in Pakistan in 2005 and 2006. They are mostly based on one-to-one (face-to-face) interviews, where I sit with the person over long periods of time. Some are undertaken in a group setting, where there may be other people such as my interpreter, family members of the interviewee, or party members present. On average I have spent 2-3 hours with each person, sometimes more formally, sometimes more familiarly, and some of the interviews have been conducted in several settings. Most of the interviews were pre-planned and the interviewees were clearly informed about the purpose of my project, my own background and the scope of the questions. The findings will not produce any statistical material or evidence. First, the number of interviews conducted will in total be only 30-35, too low a number to produce any definite findings. Secondly, I have intentionally met a variety of different people in order to illustrate a variety of voices. The selection of interview-objects has thus been made according to both persons available and the wish to show a variety of voices. The interviews have been conducted both in cities and in villages, and notably also in the camps in the earthquake effected areas and in religious schools (*madrasas*) in Pakistan. An important part of the study has also been following the sermons at Friday prayers at various mosques, in order to gain an idea of what the influence is from religious and spiritual leaders. Finally, I have interviewed both political and religious leaders and the “ordinary” man and the woman on the street.

All the people I met have been very willing to speak. Some have been more formal than others, some obviously more following a script than others. I have been cautiously aware of the fact that some may have wanted to use me as a medium for their cause and their points of view, some were hoping to convince me (“as their Muslim sister”), while some felt a duty to share their message and a sincere wish to be heard and understood. In the end I will never know if they were actually telling me the truth. I have been in situations where people were obviously painting the truth – but their responses remain their stories and the way they want to be portrayed. The authenticity of the interviews has not been checked, but I have been able to compare them with other sources such as newspaper cuttings, discussions with journalists, and similar research.

4.3 Motivations for terrorism

Theoretically there are various ways of trying to understand or to look at factors that may motivate someone to partake in terrorism. Research shows that one may divide causes into two general categories: First, *underlying reasons*; grievances that give rise to terrorism, which may include political, historical injustices, alienation and humiliation. These can be seen more as structural challenges, including lack of democratic institutions, foreign occupation, corrupt regimes, unresolved conflicts, discrimination and atrocities against fellow Muslims. Secondly, there may be “happenings” that cause a sudden moral awakening – a sudden sense of anger and revenge – or a feeling of injustice. Quintan Wiktorowicz calls this “*a crisis that produces a cognitive opening ... that shakes previously accepted beliefs and renders individuals more*

receptive to possible alternative views and perspectives".¹⁶ These factors may include a financial (sudden unemployment or no possibility of social mobility), socio-cultural (humiliations, racism, cultural weakness), political (marginalisation, torture, discrimination, corruption) or personal (death or family-tragedy, victim of a criminal activity) crisis. Although Wiktorowicz's empirical research is focused on Europe, his theoretical framework is useful in understanding what may be factors at an individual level.

Marc Sageman discusses in his work on understanding terror networks the importance of social networks – both at the levels of family and friends.¹⁷ Jessica Stern has, through her interviews with religious terrorists, asked questions as to why some people respond to grievances by joining religious terrorist groups.¹⁸ She also asks the question, as does Wiktorowicz, as to why some remain "free-riders" while others participate more actively. It is not uncommon, on the streets in Pakistan, to hear critical questions asked about the Musharraf Government – and the "Mush-Bush-Israel-India alliance" – including questions that imply sympathy for the Taliban or al-Qaida. But what makes some people give up their "ordinary" lives and choose to join extreme religious groups? Furthermore, what explains the interest that some people show for these movements, and how do they get in touch with them? Similarly, how are they convinced that this interpretation of Islam is the right one – and how do they explain their conviction to an outsider such as myself?

Motivations can be found at *different* levels and are often *mixed*: religious, political, financial, cultural or socio-psychological. In most of the cases I have found various, alternating, motives. That is, some people point to the corruption of the Government, "the biggest Satan of them all America", charismatic leaders who convince them, and *also* to religion as a way of legitimising an activity. These are the more external factors. Then there is a different layer which is more personal: the person's background and personal experiences.

One of my main questions has been: What is jihad for you, and why is jihad seen as a duty? The ways the interviewees have reasoned has differed. Some have begun by telling me their background, their family stories, their educational background and the people who are important to them in their lives. However, the religious imperative is in most cases an underlying factor, which in different contexts is used either as a true motivation, explained as "the luggage of a Mujahid" by sympathizers of Maulana Masaud Azhar or as "Islam's neglected duty", by a former member of *Hizb-ul-Mujahidin*.¹⁹ For some, though, the religious motive seems to come after the political imperative, more as an attempt to legitimise a conviction.²⁰

¹⁶ Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising. Muslim Extremism in the West*. (2005).

¹⁷ Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (2004).

¹⁸ Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God. Why Religious Militants Kill* (2003).

¹⁹ Case A.G.

²⁰ Case A.B.

Some have explained jihad as “the tax that Muslims must pay for gaining authority on Earth. The imperative to pay a price for Heaven, for the commodity of Allah is dear, very dear.”²¹ Others have pointed to the “moral obligation of jihad” as being equally important as the duties of prayer and charity within Islam, but that “only a very few are lucky to be the *chosen*”.²² One former jihadist clearly stated that he joined for fear of being punished in the after-life, while another, according to his mother (and in letters from him to his mother) wanted his family to earn respect and honour in this life. Desire for adventure and the glamour of belonging to a militant group have also been instrumental reasons. As one interviewee, a former jihadist, told me: “to be in the Military was my greatest dream, when I failed the test to enter the Pakistani Army, I found somewhere else to prove my manhood. Guns and violence were appealing. And I thought I would come back and be cheered as a hero – for my country, my people and my religion”.²³ Networks have also been important factors for some in explaining how they became involved in certain activities. Family ties, for example, daughters, sons or cousins of political figures, and friendship ties are also, for some, seen as bringing them into contact with terrorist activity.²⁴

All these questions have been instrumental in my meetings and interviews, and formed the discussions that have been held.

The process of recruitment to radical Islamist organisations has been one of my points of discussion. The interviews have shown that recruitment to jihad occurs both in a top-down and a bottom-up pattern – that is, there have been both push and pull factors, often operating at the same time: the people interviewed claim their personal conviction, but emphasise the importance of someone introducing them to the “possibilities”.

4.4 Some examples of interviews conducted

The following are a few examples of interviews conducted:

4.4.1 The Leader

“Why should he waste his time on Earth when he can go direct to Heaven?”

Case A.H.2.

A.H. is a leader of *Jamaat-ud-Dawa* (“The Society of the Call”). Interviews were conducted both in a camp in the earthquake stricken area of Pakistan and in their headquarters in Lahore.

“A crow attacks a nest of a sparrow – and attempts to kill the baby of the sparrow: Beneath the tree a man sees this and picks up his gun, shoots the crow and the sparrow baby is free. A “ghora” (a white person – a foreigner) sees this and calls him a

²¹ One of the interviewees (Case A.H.2.) here quoted Ramzi bin al-Shibh, suspected of helping to plan the 11 September 2001 attacks.

²² Case S.S.

²³ Case A.H.1.

²⁴ Cases A.B. and H.B.

terrorist”. “Our mujahids”, A.H. explains to me, “wage jihad with weapons to help our Muslim brothers and sisters. This is also a human right, to save Kashmir and Kashmiris. Over 15,000 rapes have been registered in Kashmir – the unregistered cases we do not know - this is motivation enough.” He continues: “There are two things that make a young man join us: 1) the atrocities of the enemy, which we teach them to see, and, 2) the Islamic concept of martyrdom. The Hadith says that if you die on the battlefield, you will go directly to Paradise. With so much evil in the world, why should a young person waste his time on Earth when he can go direct to Heaven?” “If that is so, how come that is not your path,” I ask. He smiles. “Actually every Muslim wishes to be a martyr, but it is not possible for all. We are given different jobs. I have been given the job and duty to train, to teach, others about the path. I teach here in our school and in the camps. But if India attacks Lahore I will for sure go to the battlefield. We don’t send youth forcibly: we only tell them to read the Holy Book and the Hadith – when read thoroughly you will also see,” he says and looks at me for the first time directly in my eyes. ““Your world” is itself responsible for what we are seeing today. Have you surveyed how many youth have gone to Iraq after Newsweek showed the reportage on Guantanamo? They are playing their own roles in motivating Muslims. We have such an easy job. We don’t have to do anything!” he laughs.’

4.4.2 The Adventurer

“Creating networks of shared meaning”

Case A.H.1.

Networks can play an important role in creating a set of values and identities – and in doing so they create a common community of “true believers” tied together through a shared interpretation of Islam”.²⁵ Marc Sageman speaks of the importance of networks, and points out that “social bonds are the critical element in this process and precede ideological commitment.”²⁶

‘A.H. is a former jihadist I met in the outskirts of Islamabad in December 2005. He tells me his story of a difficult childhood, a tragic personal story with a violent head of family – and about his break-up with his traditional family ties. He wanted to become a mechanic while his elder brother wanted him to study. He blames the struggle on different personalities, conflict with authority, and the loss of his father – the natural family head. As he left his town Faisalabad, he was searching for adventure and alternative networks of belonging. He was 15-16 years old at this time. In the many magazines and leaflets found in the bazaars he found out about the possibility of signing up for jihad. He had nothing to lose and remembered how the older boys in school had spoken with admiration of boys they knew who had gone to Kashmir – or even Afghanistan. In Muzaffarabad he met up with a so-called “recruiter” who invited him to come along to a camp in the outskirts of the capital of Pakistani-controlled

²⁵ Wiktorowicz (2005).

²⁶ Sageman (2004:135).

Kashmir. A.H. explains the comradeship and the feeling of togetherness that quickly developed within the group. They were young boys, 15-20 years old, who were all there for different reasons. They trained, prayed, ate, slept and read together.

Everything they did in groups of 10-15 people and strong bonds developed. Through religious education, lectures and by watching films about the behaviour of Indian soldiers in Kashmir and reading about the raping of Bosnian women, they developed a community – and their “yearn for revenge was developed together”. A.H. explains how religion had never really meant anything to him, but slowly they realised, together, that religion could provide some meaning – “at least it provided them with a way to move forward”, he explains. “Through technical and religious learning, through the watching of films, the praying, eating and living together, we developed as friends. The camp was in itself part of the bonding with 15-20 tents close together, each tent with 12-13 people, like in school. I remember everyday we had sessions on the atrocities of the Indian army, the rapes of the fellow Muslim sisters in Bosnia and Indian-occupied Kashmir. This brought us together in rage – for revenge.”

4.4.3 The Born Again

“Our aim was religious seeking – and jihad was our duty”

Case A.G.

Wiktorowicz writes about a process by which an individual searches “for some satisfactory system of religious meaning to interpret and resolve his discontent”. Sageman, although speaking about a Western setting, speaks of places (such as mosques or schools) that serve as an ideal place to meet people in the same phase in life – familiar people, who may be missing the community of their friends or family.

‘I met A.G. in Lahore in December 2005. He has himself fought in Afghanistan before, says he is a member of *Hizb-ul-Mujahidin*, and is ready to fight again if a suitable cause should arise – and he gets “a calling”.

A.G. explains how, when at College, friendship groups formed first to discuss issues they were interested in - politics, identity, and religion - and then slowly they found that what they were searching for was some kind of religious understanding. He says his home was not really religious, and he had missed this. He remembers they would form groups to “get back to their religion” – and many he said “felt born again”. They went together from there to the mosque, and were soon introduced through so-called “connectors” to groups such as *Hizb-ul-Mujahidin*. It became something they did in comradeship, they developed together. Two identities were developed according to A.G: 1) they became aware of who they themselves were: a group bound together by religion: “Our aim was religious seeking – and jihad was our duty”, and 2) the enemy was formed: the Russians when they went to Afghanistan, India when they went to Kashmir. It was the companionship which brought faith back to him, claims A.G., but

it was the external people who happened to be in his vicinity (the “connectors”) the ones who made the arrangements to send him to Kashmir and Afghanistan, who made him realise that this was the right way, who opened the door for him and made the transformation possible.’

A.G. fought in two periods in Afghanistan and in Kashmir.

4.4.4 The Mother Martyr

“A profession of faith to his God and his mother”

Case S.S. and S.N.

In Mansura, Lahore, I met with the two women S.S. and S.N. within the walls of the *Jamaat-i-Islami* compound.

‘Begum S.S. and Begum S.N. are both mothers of martyrs who were killed in Kashmir. They and their families are provided with housing and protection by the Islamist party *Jamaat-i-Islami*, and have agreed to tell me their sons’ and their own stories. They show me photos of their sons before they leave for jihad, and one of them shows me a photo of herself in Afghanistan on a visit to her son. She is dressed in a burqa and proudly carrying a Kalashnikov. S.S. tells of her son who wanted to join the army but was refused entry. He studied for an MBA and was a sporty young man with a black belt in Karate. She explains that they all knew it was their duty as Muslims to go to Kashmir. Her son used to say it was “for his Muslim sisters’ honour”. S.S. remembers one day her son had come home from religious class with an article from Newsweek about the suffering of Muslims around the world. “He did not go for himself, but for Islam’s honour. He went for Allah – and for all the atrocities against Muslims.”

“He was my witness to Islam” says S.N., “This is what our religious leaders say and our Qu’ran asks from us. And if I was asked to send some of my grandchildren today I would,” she says and points at the two boys playing by our feet. “The other brothers are due in line and my grandchildren too, if the cause is there,” says S.S. She tells the story of how she has not wept a tear since her son’s death. “Now he is in a place where I do not need to worry anymore. Closer to God and He provides for him now. You know even Hamid Gul (former Head of ISI) and Nawaz Sharif (former Pakistan PM) came to congratulate me,” she says. “It is the ultimate wish of a mother: His deed was a profession of faith to his God and his mother”.’

4.5 Concluding remarks

The 30-35 persons I have met and interviewed for this study all have different backgrounds and ways of interpreting their current situations. I have let them speak without attempting to put their answers into certain boxes. This is also due to them being in very different situations at the moment. The various mothers of martyrs I met view their situation differently as some of them today live under the protection of a religious party (e.g. *Jamaat-i-Islami*) while others

have not received the same honour and pride that was promised their sons. Likewise, two men with similar stories of fighting in both Kashmir and Afghanistan, around about the same time, have today two different outlooks on life. One is ready for “another cause worthy to fight a jihad and die for” – and mentions the possibility of Iraq - while the other says he has lost 10 years of his life and his jihad today is to work in his car repair shop and to tell young people not to waste their lives nor to listen to manipulative religious leaders who are only working for their own interests and agendas.

The sample of interviews shows unique individual stories. They are different people, with different stories and all represent different ways of explaining their definition, understanding and motivation for jihad. By sitting over long periods of time with the individuals, many in their own familiar settings, one can come to learn a lot about the roles that psychology, group dynamics and the importance of socialising – and external factors, such as friends, role models, leaders - play in shaping various actors.

One of the things I have been attempting to find out is at what point do the various people I have spoken to make the *link* to violent jihad – or terrorism. How do they explain this *meeting* – and how do *they themselves* explain the different factors which have come to play in this struggle.

“We all have our jihad – it only depends what you are chosen for”, one *Jamat-ud-Dawa* leader explains me. He continues: “The power of what can be done for God has been sanctioned by the divine mandate or conceived in the mind of God”. “This is why it is difficult for secularists to understand,” he says.²⁷ The challenge in conducting these kinds of interviews is in meeting the “other” in their cognitive world. How much empathy can you feel – and how much is needed to be able to portray a picture of the cases as they themselves want to be portrayed?

Through these interviews I have attempted to come a step closer to an understanding of the people and the mental and social processes that occur in the course of being introduced to radical groups. Behind most decisions and acts there are individual stories. The aim of the project is to come closer to these.

In April 2006 I will be returning to conduct more interviews. Some will be with the same individuals that I have already met, to attempt to develop further trust with them, to ask them further questions. But I also hope to meet more people, and I expect even more individual interpretations – personal stories of the many ways to jihad. The portraits remain my main empirical source of attempting to understand the underlying questions that motivate people to choose a violent way of jihad.

²⁷ Case A.H.2.

5 THE AL-QAIDA STRATEGIST ABU MUS‘AB AL-SURI: A PROFILE

By Brynjar Lia, PhD, Senior Researcher

5.1 Introduction

In early July, 2005, shortly after the first wave of the London bombings had ended, a Washington Post article reported that investigations into recent al-Qaida operations in European countries, from London and Madrid to Casablanca and Istanbul, had nabbed only ‘the hands’, not the ‘brains’ behind these attacks.²⁸ At the same time, a little known Syrian-born jihadist, known as Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, was suggested as being the mastermind behind the London attacks on 7 July 2005. This echoed previous media reports in late 2004 and subsequent statements in 2005 by the head of a European intelligence service that al-Suri was the strategist behind the bombings in Madrid on 11 March 2004. In late 2004, other media reports based on interviews with antiterrorism investigators and intelligence officials, suggested that al-Suri had played a role in assisting the 9/11 hijackers, referring to his and his deputies’ meetings with the hijackers in Germany and Spain, the last of which was the crucial Tarragona meeting in July 2001, where Muhammad Atta was given authority to carry out the attacks.

Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Setmariam Nasar (b.1958), who is perhaps best known by pen names Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri and Umar Abd al-Hakim, has been known in radical Islamist circles for at least a decade. However, little has been written about him in Western scholarship, and media reporting on al-Suri has been relatively scant. To a Western audience, he first became widely known in late 2004 when Spanish investigations into the Madrid train bombings (also known as M-11) pointed to his role as the mastermind of the attacks. A Syrian militant with Spanish citizenship, al-Suri served as a military instructor and lecturer in the Afghan-Arab training camps from 1987-92. He spent several years in Spain and the United Kingdom, before he moved back to Afghanistan in 1998 where he ran an al-Qaida affiliated training camp and a media center. Al-Suri has been wanted by Spanish authorities since November 2001. His name also occurred in the media in late 2004 following the announcement by the US State Department on 17 November 2004 of a \$5 million reward to anyone who provided information leading to his arrest. At that time, the US administration considered him among the most dangerous al-Qaida terrorists at large. Similarly, the head of the private investigation on behalf of the September 11th victims, Jean-Charles Brisard, described al-Suri as ‘one of the Salafist terrorists representing the highest potential for harm in the Middle East’. A few expert commentaries have also emphasized al-Suri’s role as a ‘pen-jihadist’, pointing to his considerable intellectual contribution that he has produced in the

²⁸ This article is an excerpt of a forthcoming book on Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri and his writings. The study is entirely based on publicly available sources. All footnotes and references are available upon request.

service of the jihadist movement, in particular his voluminous book *Da‘wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-‘alamiyyah* (‘The Call for an International Islamic Resistance’). Internet commentaries on Arab discussion forums have called him al-Qaida’s Fukuyama, and have emphasised the importance of his work in formulating strategies for decentralised global warfare and the concept of ‘individualised terrorism’. Recent expert commentaries on al-Qaida have also seen examples that al-Suri’s theories are being operationalised to support jihadist operations, in particular in the wake of the Sinai terrorist attacks in October 2005.

There can be little doubt that Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri has played an important role in international jihadist terrorism, if not as an active operative, then at least in terms of providing practical training, and preparing jihadist terrorists with the theoretical and intellectual foundation for their violent campaigns. The centrality of al-Suri in the jihadist movement in recent years highlights the importance of uncovering his biography: where does he come from, what is his political and ideological background, how did he become involved in al-Qaida, what are his contributions to and role in the jihadist movement over the past decade, and what can his life-story tell us about al-Qaida and global jihadism today?

The following paper will shed light on Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri’s biography and give a brief glimpse into his most recent writings.

5.2 The Syrian Jihad

Al-Suri grew up in a conservative middle class family in Aleppo, Syria. In 1976 he enrolled at the University of Aleppo where he studied mechanical engineering for four years. He must have been profoundly influenced by the political turmoil in Syria during these years, when the Islamist opposition, led by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, launched a large-scale campaign against the Syrian regime. The protests escalated into violent attacks, especially in al-Suri’s hometown. Around 1980, al-Suri says he experienced a religious awakening. He had not yet finished his education, but decided, nevertheless, to join, together with several of his acquaintances, the *al-Tali‘ah al-Muqatilah* (The Fighting Vanguard), a militant offshoot of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. After having participated in several violent operations in Syria, his cell was uncovered by the authorities and many were arrested. Al-Suri and many other *al-Tali‘ah al-Muqatilah* members decided to relocate to Jordan. This inaugurated al-Suri’s life as a jihadist in exile. As far as is known, he never returned to Syria.

In Jordan al-Suri joined the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organisation, and rose quickly in their ranks. Due to sharp rivalries between Syria and its neighbours, the Syrian opposition operated relatively unrestrictedly in Iraq and Jordan. Al-Suri received military training at Syrian MB safe houses in Jordan, and was subsequently sent to Iraq, where the Syrian MB had extensive military training facilities at their disposal. Al-Suri was trained in special operations, guerrilla warfare techniques and explosives engineering. Because of his skills, he became military instructor and later a member of the Syrian MB’s military command in Baghdad. Some time in 1981 or 1982, he also went with a small group of Syrian jihadists to Cairo where they received security and intelligence training.

The Syrian regime cracked down very harshly on the Islamist uprising, especially in the city of Hama, where some 10,000-30,000 people were killed and much of the city was devastated. The destruction of Hama ended the Syrian MB-led uprising and al-Suri came to blame the organisation for the failed revolt. He broke with the Syrian MB leadership. Disillusioned about the future of the Syrian jihad, he left for Saudi Arabia on a pilgrimage in 1982. He attempted to enroll at the University of Medina, but encountered restrictions by what he perceived as a Muslim Brotherhood dominated religious elite at the University. When an opportunity to study in Europe opened up, he left for France, where he enrolled at a Faculty of Engineering, intending to complete his studies. However, he remained involved in the Syrian jihadist movement, and over the coming years, he spent much time reconnecting with the scattered community of Syrian MB and *al-Tali'ah al-Muqatilah* veterans. The idea of reviving the Uprising in Syria had not yet been abandoned and al-Suri was involved in several attempts at infiltrating fighters and rebuilding networks inside Syria. However, these attempts failed, and like many other jihadist activists, al-Suri had become a jihadist without a jihad.

In 1985, al-Suri moved to Spain on an invitation from relatives and acquaintances, where he suffered materially until he managed to start his own import and export business. During this period he began writing his first large study on the jihadist movement, originally entitled 'The Syrian Islamic Jihadist Revolution – Pains and Hopes' (*al-thawra al-islamiyya al-jihadiyya fi suria – alam wa amal*). The book is better known as the 'Comments on the Jihadist Experience in Syria'. The study was later published, apparently around 1990, in Peshawar, and distributed widely among the various jihadist groups present there. It analysed the Syrian jihadist movement, with a view to drawing lessons for the future of that experience. The book may be considered his breakthrough as 'a jihadist intellectual'.

However, in the meantime, al-Suri gained a firmer foothold in Spain by getting his small company up and running and by marrying a Spanish woman, Elena Moreno in 1988, and thereby gaining Spanish citizenship. For al-Suri, their relationship was genuinely a love affair, not simply a way to get European residency rights.

5.3 Afghanistan 1987-1992

As the prospects for reviving the Syrian jihad in the mid-1980s appeared slim, and the Mujahidin resistance in Afghanistan electrified and attracted radical Islamists from most parts of the Muslim world, al-Suri and some five others of his Syrian fellow fighters departed for Peshawar and Afghanistan in 1987. There, they hoped to garner support for the jihad in Syria. Al-Suri had apparently been preoccupied with the issue of Afghanistan since the early or mid-1980s, and he stayed in Afghanistan most of the period between 1987 and 1992, leaving the country shortly before Kabul fell. In Peshawar or possibly in Afghanistan proper, al-Suri and his friends met with Shaykh 'Abdallah 'Azzam, the father of the Arab-Afghan movement and one of al-Qaida's founding members. Their first meeting took place in July 1987, which was also the first time al-Suri visited Afghanistan.

Al-Suri and his friends went to Afghanistan to garner support for the Syrian jihadist movement, but these requests met with considerable scepticism from Abdallah Azzam, who considered the door to the Syrian jihad closed. Instead, he invited al-Suri to join the global jihad-movement, represented by the Arab-Afghans in Afghanistan.

When al-Suri raised the issue of relocating to Afghanistan with his comrades in the *al-Tali'ah al-Muqatilah* exile community, they were not convinced. Very few, if any, came to join his small group in Afghanistan. Al-Suri deplored how many of them had 'a narrow regional conception' of their struggle. Although the issue was of ideological character, it was in fact the reality that had been forced through 'a transformation of goals'. Al-Suri later recalled that 'we left the Syrian cause because there existed no opportunity to revive it and we turned to the Afghan cause instead'. The resources for restarting the Syrian jihad were simply not there; they were 'cut off', and isolated from the Syrian scene, and as time went by they were also alienated from their homeland:

'We were dissolved the way most other [jihadist] groups dissolved, by the fact that we were no longer in the field. Between us and our country were thousands of kilometers, and now, the distance in time are tens of thousands of kilometers. We were unable to do anything. [...] we could not do anything along that path, so we entered the framework of contributing to the international jihad.'

For al-Suri, this period was the time when 'the global character of the duty of jihad' and the 'global nature of the Muslim causes' became apparent to him in earnest. Al-Suri and the five other Syrian jihadists who arrived with him in Afghanistan, suffered losses on the various battle fronts; one of them was killed in Jalalabad and another in Khowst, while yet another left Afghanistan. The idea of reviving the Syrian jihad grew more distant with every day that passed, and their struggle came to be centered on Afghanistan and other pan-Islamic causes. It is probably wrong, though, to see this shift from a local to a global jihad as synonymous with al-Qaida's and bin Ladin's declaration of a global war against the Crusaders. For al-Suri and his fellow fighters, the priority at this point was to support other 'jihadist revolutions' in their local or regional struggle for an Islamic state, rather than to link the fight to and against the West. After all, al-Qaida's declared war on the 'far enemy', the United States and Israel only began in 1998.

The meeting with Abdallah Azzam in July 1987 was decisive for al-Suri, and over the next two and a half years, until Azzam's assassination in Peshawar in November 1989, al-Suri claims to have spent nearly every day in his company. Drawing upon his military training and expertise, al-Suri became military instructor at several Arab-Afghan training camps. He met with Usama bin Ladin and says he worked for bin Ladin's organisation, al-Qaida, which was founded in early 1988, until 1992. Al-Suri now became a member of al-Qaida's highest organ, the Shura Council, where he was regarded as the representative of the Syrians.

The Afghanistan-period allowed al-Suri to establish wide networks of contacts with jihadist intellectuals, activists and groups from around the Arab-Islamic world. Al-Suri became close

to a very prominent scholar, Shaykh Abd al-Qadir bin Abd al-Aziz, the mufti of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad-organisation, whose work *al-'Umda fi i'dad al-'udda lil-jihad fi sabil allah*. ('The Pillar in the Preparation of Jihad in the Way of God'), is a standard work in the jihadist curriculum. He also established close bonds with the Libyan, Moroccan and Algerian, jihadist community, especially the Algerian jihadist leader Qari Said, who later founded the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria in the early 1990s.

In around 1990, al-Suri presented the first sketch of what became his largest and most influential work, the *Call for a Global Islamic Resistance*. At the same time, his work on the Syrian jihadist experience was released. From now on, his ambition to become a leading jihadist intellectual is evident, and as he moved back to Spain in 1992, this dream was not forgotten.

The paradigmatic shifts during the years around 1990, when the Islamic world faced a whole new set of challenges, propelled al-Suri into the role of a jihadist intellectual. At the beginning of the 1990s, al-Suri says that he increasingly felt that their battlefield 'was about to close' and that he wanted to 'fulfill his mission' in Afghanistan and move on. Al-Suri had also grown disillusioned about his own role as a military instructor, given the dwindling support for the jihadist cause among the broader Islamist movement:

'I am not prepared to train [people] in shooting practices because I think they will fire back at us justifying this by the fatwas of the Muslim Brothers and the Azhar clerics [...] People come to us with empty heads and leave us with empty heads [...] They have done nothing for Islam. This is because they have not received any ideological or doctrinal training'

The more immediate reason for al-Suri to move out of Afghanistan was the infighting between the Afghan warlords. There was also the attraction of emerging arenas of jihad, among which Algeria figured very prominently. Hundreds, if not thousands, of Algerians returned from Afghanistan to Algeria during these years, and many of them became the backbone of the most radical factions in the Islamist opposition. Furthermore, unlike many of his fellow Arab fighters in Afghanistan, who were wanted fugitives in their countries of origin, and risked detention and deportation when travelling abroad, al-Suri enjoyed the privileges of a European citizenship and a safe haven in Spain.

5.4 A European Jihad 1992-97

When al-Suri returned to Spain in around 1992, he lost little time in reconnecting with his networks of jihadist contacts. During this period, when the Bosnian and Algerian wars radicalised and frustrated Muslim opinion, al-Suri participated in the establishment of an al-Qaida cell in Spain, which subsequently became one of al-Qaida's main supporting structures in Europe under the leadership of al-Suri's friend and former Syrian MB member, Imad al-Din Bakarat Yarkas (Abu Dahdah). His friendship with the Algerian jihadists, especially Qari Said, led him to consider seriously moving to Algeria. Having made a pledge to Said that he would

go to Algeria in case the latter managed to ‘restart the jihad’ in his home country, al-Suri felt obliged to assist the GIA, founded by Qari Said. Uneasy about going to Algeria, al-Suri went to London in 1994, where he became a very active member of the GIA’s media apparatus, first and foremost as editor and writer for the al-Ansar bulletin, GIA’s primary mouthpiece. Al-Suri’s involvement in ‘jihadist journalism’ extended to a number of other militant journals, such as the *al-Fajr* bulletin, issued by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and the *al-Mujahidun*, published by the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

During these years in London, 1994-97, al-Suri nurtured a wide network of contacts in the worldwide jihadist community and beyond. The list of his contacts included Imad al-Din Bakarat Yarkas (Abu Dahdah) and many of his closest collaborators in the emerging Spanish al-Qaida cell. Al-Suri also worked closely with Umar Mahmud, Uthman Abu Umar (Abu Qutada) who was later considered al-Qaida’s spiritual leader in Europe. Abu Qutada was the chief editor of the Al-Ansar magazine, for which al-Suri was editor and a frequent contributor. It appears that rivalries and disagreements between the two on the Algerian issue soured their relationship.

Al-Suri also maintained contacts with prominent Saudi bin Ladin sympathisers such as Khalid Fawwaz and leading Saudi dissidents, such as Saad al-Faqih, the head of the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA). His contacts also included Riyad al-Uqla (Abu Nabil), the top representative of the Jordan-based *al-Tali‘ah al-Muqatilah*, and the Syrian businessman Ma’mun Darkanzali, based in the Hamburg district of Uhlenhorst. Darkanzali was later indicted by Spain and the United States on charges of being a key al-Qaida financier in Europe, and of assisting the Hamburg cell.²⁹ One of al-Suri’s principal associates was Muhammad Bahayah (Abu Khalid al-Suri), who was variously described as a ‘mid-level’ activist, ‘courier’ and a ‘member of Usama bin Ladin’s structures in Europe’.³⁰ He operated mostly out of Turkey, until he fled to Iran and Afghanistan in 1999.

Al-Suri also knew Taysir Allouni very well, the famous al-Jazira journalist who was arrested and convicted by Spanish authorities to seven years in jail for assisting al-Qaida figures among al-Suri’s contacts. Allouni and al-Suri had both been members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, and stayed in contact during the 1980s when they both lived in Grenada, Spain.

Al-Suri reportedly nurtured contacts with at least two jihadists in Denmark, one of them a person referred to only as Abu Rashid or Abu Rashid al-Halabi, a Syrian MB activist, who had obtained permanent residence in Denmark, and who was considered a member of Abu Dahdah’s Spanish al-Qaida cell. The second contact in Denmark was Said Mansur (Abu

²⁹ According to Spanish authorities, Darkanzali transferred ca 1,400 Deutsche Mark [DM, which is the former German currency] from his account in Germany to an account in al-Suri’s name in Grenada in November 1993, and in February 1996, 3,200 DM was sent to al-Suri’s account in London from an account, registered in the name of Darkanzali’s wife, Brigitte.

³⁰ Tim Golden & Judith Miller, ‘Al Qaeda Money Trail Runs From Saudi Arabia to Spain’, *The New York Times* 21 September 2002; and D. Martinez and P. Munoz, ‘Syrian in custody in London for 11 March was ‘political chief’ of Abu Dahdah’s cell’, (in Spanish), *ABC Newspaper* (Madrid, internet version) 24 March 2005, via FBIS.

Abdallah), a Danish resident of Moroccan origin, who worked closely with al-Suri in preparing and distributing the al-Ansar journal.³¹

Amir Azizi ('Uthman al-Andalusi), a 38-year-old Moroccan with Spanish citizenship was also among al-Suri's companions from the Madrid period. Azizi has been described as a deputy and envoy for al-Suri, and is suspected of having played a role in the Madrid bombings.

Around 1995, al-Suri and many other of the London-based jihadists grew increasingly uneasy about the bloody terrorist campaign in Algeria and the GIA's role in that violence. Al-Suri decided to sever his relationship with the GIA media cell and pursue 'independent journalism'. In cooperation with his companion Muhammad Bahayah, he set up his own media center, registered as 'Islamic Conflict Studies Bureau LTD', and set up a bank account for the center in March 1997. Al-Suri planned to launch a website for the media centre, with a view to elevating it to 'the level of contemporary media'. Furthermore, he planned to produce online newsletters at the centre, wishing to develop this newsletter into a paid online service for the various news agencies, something which would bring financial resources to his centre. It is uncertain whether these plans ever materialized. However, al-Suri was successful in facilitating several top international media events for the al-Qaida leadership in 1996-98. He accompanied teams of reporters from BBC and CNN from London into Afghanistan to bin Ladin's Headquarter where bin Ladin's first appearance on global satellite networks was recorded. Those media events, especially the CNN interview, were regarded as an unqualified success in the jihadist community.

5.5 Back to Afghanistan

In 1997, al-Suri decided to move back to Afghanistan, following the Taleban's seizure of power in Kabul. Due to his high-level contacts with bin Ladin and his media activities on behalf of the GIA, al-Suri had been briefly arrested by British authorities and he felt there was a campaign of harassment against him and like-minded people. He later came to see the latter part of the 1990s as a turning point in the relationship between the United Kingdom and the jihadist current. The promise of safe haven in 'Londonistan' had been broken and the seeds for the London bombings on 7 July 2005 were laid during these years, he later wrote.

In Afghanistan, al-Suri established a close relationship with the Taleban government. He authored a long treatise on the Taleban's achievements and failures from a Salafi-Jihadi perspective and concluded that the Taleban, despite some weaknesses, must be considered a true Islamic Emirate, and the only true Islamic State on the planet. Hence, it was a duty upon every true Muslim to emigrate to Afghanistan and fight for this Emirate.

Back in Afghanistan, al-Suri established and directed 'a training camp for Arab Mujahidin in service of Usama bin Ladin'. His military base, called al-Ghuraba' ('The Aliens'), was

³¹ Mansur was arrested by Danish police on 8 September 2005, charged under the new antiterrorism law enacted in 2002 for distributing films and CD-roms containing 'inflammatory jihadist speeches'.

nominally a Taleban military facility, and it was founded only after he had pledged an oath of obedience (*bay'ah*) 'hand to hand with the Emir of the Faithful Mulla Umar' in April 2000. The camp was established at the Kargha military base in Kabul, in cooperation with the Taleban Ministry of Defence. His training activities were directed towards catering for the needs of the global jihadist movement, but not to educate Taleban foot-soldiers. He later claims that he:

'personally oversaw training of both Arab and non-Arab Muslims in my military camp, the al-Ghuraba Camp. Some of the trainees were either born, raised or are currently living in Britain. Some were of other Western nationalities, including American Muslims...'.³²

In addition to his own al-Ghuraba camp in Kabul, al-Suri is also believed to have served as military instructor at the large Darunta training complex near Jalalabad, in particular at the Abu Khabab camp, where al-Qaida experimented with chemical weapons, and developed manuals for non-conventional warfare. Much has been made out of reports that al-Suri was heavily involved in al-Qaida's WMD program, but the main thrust of his work during this period seems to be of a political and strategic nature, not weapon-specific manuals. Since the latter part of the 1990s, al-Suri wrote prodigiously, producing studies of the Taleban, Central Asia, Pakistan, Syria, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, some with a view to gaining new insight from past jihadist experiences, others were political analyses of recent developments, combined with exhortations to join the global jihad.

While al-Suri trained international jihadists and nurtured close links with the Taleban, he also grew increasingly disillusioned with bin Ladin and the latter's obsessive need for international publicity, which, in turn, isolated and endangered the Taleban regime. In July 1999 he and his associate Muhammad al-Bahayah wrote the following email to bin Ladin:

'Noble brother Abu Abdullah, Peace upon you, and God's mercy and blessings. This message [concerns] the problem between you and the Leader of the Faithful ...

The results of this crisis can be felt even here in Kabul and other places. Talk about closing down the camps has spread. Discontent with the Arabs has become clear. Whispers between the Taliban with some of our non-Arab brothers has become customary. In short, our brother Abu Abdullah's latest troublemaking with the Taliban and the Leader of the Faithful jeopardizes the Arabs, and the Arab presence, today in all of Afghanistan, for no good reason. It provides a ripe opportunity for all adversaries, including America, the West, the Jews, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the Mas'ud-Dostum alliance, etc., to serve the Arabs a blow that could end up causing their most faithful allies to kick them out ... Our brother [bin Laden] will help our enemies reach their goal free of charge! ...

³² Cited in 'Abu Musab al-Suri's Final "Message to the British and the Europeans",' *GlobalTerrorAlert* 31 December 2005, www.globalterroralert.com/pdf/1205/abumusabeurope.pdf#search='Abu%20Musab%20alSuri'. Accessed December 2005.

The strangest thing I have heard so far is Abu Abdullah's saying that he wouldn't listen to the Leader of the Faithful when he asked him to stop giving interviews ... I think our brother [bin Laden] has caught the disease of screens, flashes, fans, and applause [...].³³

Due to his outspokenness, al-Suri was perhaps erroneously seen as a leader of 'a group of secessionists', who had pledged loyalty to the Taleban. The secessionists were reportedly allowed to operate freely on Afghan territory and were promised that the training camps would be reopened. These had been closed due to international repercussions following the East Africa embassy bombings in 1998.

As news of the al-Qaida secessionists was reported in Western and Arab media at the end of July 2000, al-Suri promptly gave an interview to al-Jazeera TV, in which he strenuously denied the reports of a secession, and criticized the TV channel for broadcasting 'unfounded and totally baseless allegations'. The interview is interesting in light of the role which al-Suri then claimed for himself in the jihadist movement. He said

'[O]ver the past few years, I have been present in the jihad or Islamic movement as a writer, researcher, thinker, and theorizer or ideologist so to speak. I do not enjoy any party or organizational capacity. I neither belong to Al-Qa'idah organization nor to any other organizations. I back their ideas and call upon this nation to stand against all its enemies. However, from an organizational point of view, I am not a member in Al-Qa'idah group.'³⁴

However, he did describe himself as 'very close to the circles here', and he took pride in being 'at the top of the list of invitees to Shaykh Usama's wedding' in mid-2000, when the latter married a Yemeni woman. Although 'not being a member in the al-Qaida group', he nevertheless describes his relationship with them as 'that of fraternity, friendship, and participation in good and sad occasions. We are one family. I mean those who you termed as the Arab Afghans. We were, and are still, one family.'³⁵

5.6 A Role in Terrorist Operations?

As a prominent trainer, military instructor and jihadist lecturer, al-Suri had a large network of top-level contacts in many jihadist organisations, and he is believed to have trained militants who later returned to Europe as ' sleeper cells ', especially in Spain, Italy and France, according to Spanish authorities. However, reports about his specific involvement in terrorist operations remain scant. There are unconfirmed reports that he may have been present at the decisive 'Tarragona summit' in July 2001, where Muhammad Atta and Ramzi bin al-Shibh met to put

³³ Cited in Alan Cullison, 'Inside Al-Qaeda's Hard Drive', *The Atlantic Monthly* September 2004, www.theatlantic.com/doc/200409/cullison. Accessed September 2005.

³⁴ Cited in 'Reports of split in Bin Laden's group denied,' (LexisNexis Title), 'Al-Jazeera at MIDDAY'-programme, *Al-Jazeera TV*, 1 August 2000 1240 GMT via LexisNexis.

³⁵ Ibid.

the final touches on the 9/11 plot. His possible involvement in hatching the Madrid bombings on March 11th 2004 seems more plausible.

Two months after the Madrid attacks, the Spanish press reported ‘a major advance’ in the investigation into the massacre, pointing to new evidence, directly implicating al-Suri and his lieutenants:

‘These investigations have shown that an “intermediary” of Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, better known as Abu Musab al-Suri, whom the investigators regard as the “mastermind” of the “trains of death”, travelled to Spain at the end of last year. [...] According to the police inquiries, after arriving in Spain Setmariam’s “intermediary” made contact with one of the 3/11 killers to pass on to him the instructions which the Al-Qa‘idah leader had given him.’³⁶

Citing Spanish security sources, the British press also emphasized al-Suri’s possible mastermind role in the Madrid attacks, suggesting furthermore that al-Suri was planning similar attacks in London. This was reported several months before the London Underground attacks in July 2005. According to documents uncovered in an apartment used by some of the Madrid bombers,

‘their leader, Mustafa Setmariam Nasar [i.e. al-Suri], ordered them to strike in the final days of the Spanish election campaign last March. The coded command was sent three months earlier; Nasar left it to his lieutenants in Spain to decide what the target should be.’³⁷

According to a press interview with a counterterrorism advisor to the Spanish government since 2004, the seized documents with al-Suri’s instructions also revealed that the Madrid attacks were to be followed by a series of suicide attacks in Spain. The planned terrorist campaign was interrupted when the bombers were cornered in an apartment in Leganes, where they decided to blow themselves up.

5.7 On the Run: In Iran and in Hiding 2001-2005

With the fall of Kabul in late 2001, al-Suri was forced to flee, together with the remaining al-Qaida leadership. The collapse of the Taleban Emirate in Afghanistan was a big blow to al-Suri and he later estimated that al-Qaida lost some 80 % of its manpower over the next two years. With the new post 9/11 world order and the US global power projection, al-Suri clearly saw the balance of power tipping dangerously in the jihadist movements’ disfavour, and he began rewriting his theories in his work *The Call for Global Islamic Resistance*, taking into account the futility of safe havens upon which traditional guerrilla warfare theories rested.

³⁶ D. Martinez and J. Pagola, ‘Al-Qa‘idah ordered 3/11 cell to prepare the massacre at end of 2003’, (in Spanish) *ABC* (Spanish newspaper, Madrid, Internet Version-WWW) 17 May 04, via FBIS.

³⁷ Edward Owen and Daniel McGrory, ‘Madrid mastermind may plan UK attack’, *The Times* (London) 5 March 2005, www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-1511134,00.html. Accessed July 2005. See also David Paul and Mike Parker, ‘Hunt For Terror Boss’, *Sunday Express* 10 July 2005, p. 11.

Al-Suri describes the period after the fall of Taleban as ‘three meager years which we spent as fugitives, fleeing from the Americans and their apostate collaborators, moving between safe houses and hideouts...’. He was ‘on the move between numerous areas’, stayed in ‘numerous conditions’ and was heavily affected by ‘the complicated security situation’ but since the beginning of 2002 he did nothing else apart from studying and writing in order to complete his research. Al-Suri also describes his condition as one of ‘house arrest and restricted movement’ (*dhuruf al-iqamah al-ijbariyya wa qillat al-harakah*), indicating that he was held in some sort of custody by a state authority.³⁸ He also claims to have met Usama bin Ladin ‘for the last time in November 2001 during the battles for defending the Islamic Emirate’.

He obviously feared that something would happen that would prevent him from completing the work of his life-time, 1,604 page treatise ‘The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance’, especially after the US Administration in mid-November 2004 announced a \$5 million bounty on his head. He therefore decided to speed up the release of his book before the final reviews and corrections had been made, promising his readers an updated and corrected version in the course of 2005. Hence, al-Suri’s official silence lasted until December 2004, when he, in a communiqué issued by his media office, declared that:

‘After the 9/11 events and the fall of the Islamic emirate in Afghanistan in December 2001, I had taken the decision to enter into total isolation, cut the relationship with the outer world, and abstain from following and studying the events in the mass media, and devote myself to reading and writing. [...] As a result of the US government’s declaration about me, the lies it contained and the new security requirements it forced upon us, I have taken the decision to end my period of isolation, and to publish what I have written until now. I will also resume my ideological, media-related and operational activities. I wish by God that America will regret bitterly that they provoked me and others to combat her with pen and sword.’³⁹

Al-Suri’s declaration was obviously issued in direct response to the US Department of State’s announcement of the \$5 million bounty on al-Suri’s head. Despite his claim of ‘having entered total isolation’, it seems likely that al-Suri remained involved in operational activities from Pakistani-Afghan border areas, as well as from Iranian territory.

Al-Suri was among a number of al-Qaida leaders, including Sayf al-Adil, Sa‘d bin Ladin, Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi and others, who sought refuge in Iran after the fall of the Taleban regime, and had operated for some time from Iranian territory. Names of al-Qaida leaders present in Iran have figured in various media outlets since 2002, and there is little doubt that a number of leading al-Qaida members have been present on Iranian territory for extended periods of time. Al-Suri is believed to have entered Iranian territory at the beginning of 2002. Initially, al-Suri

³⁸ Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, *Da‘wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-‘alamiyyah*, p. 8.

³⁹ Cited in *Bayan sadir ‘an maktab al-shaykh (Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri)*, p. 2. See also *Ta‘rif bil-shaykh ‘umar ‘abd al-hakim (abu mus‘ab al-suri)*, p. 3.

and other al-Qaida leaders were arrested and transferred to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) barracks near the holy city of Mashad, in western Iran. However, after the US Administration declared Iran to be part of the axis of evil, the IRGC apparently allowed al-Qaida leaders to enter and leave Iran as long as they sought approval from the IRGC's high command.

A Spanish press report in March 2005, citing European antiterrorist services, suggested that al-Suri and his associate Amir Azizi had found permanent refuge in 'Iranian Kurdistan', where they headed al-Qaida's 'Andalusian clan', a network of some 100 fighters with experiences from the wars in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Chechnya.⁴⁰ This network allegedly 'extended through North Africa and Europe', and 'is planning attacks in Europe'.⁴¹

In 2002-3, al-Suri became involved with the Iraqi theatre of war, and the emerging Iraqi insurgency movements, first and foremost with the famous Jordanian militant Ahmad Fadil Nazzal al-Khalaylah, better known as Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, who later became head of the 'Qaidat al-Jihad Organisation in the Lands of the Two Rivers', al-Qaida's primary branch in Iraq. Al-Suri had initiated contacts with al-Zarqawi since the latter's arrival in Afghanistan in 1999, and after the collapse of the Taleban, these contacts continued. In 2002, al-Suri visited the area controlled by Ansar al-Islam in 'Kurdistan' in Northern Iraq, where several of al-Zarqawi's followers were stationed. Interestingly, their camp bore the same name as al-Suri's camp in Kabul. It is uncertain what role al-Suri played in Iraq as the insurgency gained ground from mid-2003. While he may have exerted some ideological influence on al-Zarqawi and offered him advice on guerrilla warfare tactics, he is rarely, if ever, cited in the voluminous Iraqi insurgency propaganda literature.

It is uncertain how long al-Suri spent in Iran. The country became gradually less hospitable for al-Qaida fighters. In August 2005, former US intelligence officials told press reporters that al-Suri had indeed entered Iran, but said that he 'was eventually asked to leave'.⁴² Al-Suri probably returned to Pakistan where most former al-Qaida commanders were hiding and where the sympathies and the support structures for foreign jihadists were still considerable. Al-Suri was reportedly arrested in Quetta in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan, near the southern Afghan border in late October or early November 2005.

5.8 Glimpses from Al-Suri's strategic literature

While al-Suri may have played a role in the most high-profile terrorist attacks in the Western world in recent times, his lasting legacy will not be his presumed operative activity, but his

⁴⁰ Pedro Arnuero, 'Two Spanish terrorists control Al-Qa'idah's "Andalusian clan" in Europe', *La Razon* 21 March 2005 via BBC Monitoring.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Katherine Shrader, 'Wanted Muslim extremist hopscoches the globe connecting terrorists', *Associated Press* 3 August 2005.

contribution to the growing body of ‘jihadi strategic studies’, a term coined by this author and Thomas Hegghammer in a recent article in *Studies of Conflict and Terrorism*.⁴³

Al-Suri’s most important work is *The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance*, a 1,600 page study which has received considerable attention, both inside and outside jihadist circles, and has earned him praise such as ‘the greatest jihadi theoretician in our time’.⁴⁴ The voluminous work includes a detailed account of the history of key jihadist movements around the world, emphasising in particular their weaknesses, mistakes and flaws, with a view to learn from the past. In contrast to much of the Salafist-Jihadist literature, the style is self-critical, rational, pseudo-scientific and, relatively speaking, secular in style. The historical analysis is followed by a series of detailed practical theories about various aspects of jihadist warfare: the religious-legal fundament, the political aspect, military and organisational aspects, ways of conducting training, theories of financing, methods of media and agitation, etc.

Its strongest aspect is perhaps its clear recognition of the drastically changed balance of power between the Crusader Alliance and their Muslim collaborators on the one side and the global jihadist movement on the other. It emphasises especially the overwhelming US dominance of airspace. Al-Suri himself noticed this already during the shelling of al-Qaida camps in 1998, when US cruise missiles hit one building each, shattering the myth that Afghanistan’s distant and rugged mountains provided solid protection. Al-Suri concluded that in the post 9/11 era territorial consolidation and guerrilla warfare from fixed bases in rugged terrain is impossible. A new Afghanistan is unimaginable, at least in the short term. Instead, the future jihadist war must be led by small decentralised, mobile units operating completely independently of any centralised organisation.

In al-Suri’s thinking, there are basically three types of jihadist warfare⁴⁵:

- The *Tanzims*, which are local or regional hierarchical secret organisations. Examples of such groups in contemporary history are plentiful: Egyptian Islamic Jihad, The Fighting Vanguard Organisation in Syria, The Shabiba-movement in Morocco, the Asbat al-Ansar group in Lebanon, etc
- “Open Fronts”, which are essentially large-scale insurgencies against an occupying or imperial power. The most prominent examples are Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, etc
- “The Jihad of Individualised Terrorism”, which are sporadic acts of terrorism carried out by small, autonomous cells or individuals, unconnected to organised formations. Examples are Ramzi Yusuf, the mastermind of the first World Trade Center bombings in New York in 1993 and Sayyid Nusayr, the assassin of the Jewish rightwing Rabbi Meir Kahane in 1990.

⁴³ See Brynjar Lia, Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi Strategic Studies - The alleged al-Qaida policy study preceding the Madrid bombings,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 27 (5) (September - October 2004), pp. 355-375.

⁴⁴ See ‘Make this a permanent link: A collection of all jihadist movies from all fronts. God is great!’ (in Arabic), *Muntadayat al-Nusra* website 11 February 2006, by a contributor nicknamed ‘Hamza al-Shami’ (written in Arabic letters), <http://www.alnusra.net/vb/showthread.php?t=157&highlight=%C3%C8%E6+%E3%D5%DA%C8+%C7%E1%D3%E6%D1%ED>. Accessed February 2006,

⁴⁵ The following section refers primarily to Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, *Da‘wat al-muqawamah al-islamiyyah al-‘alamiyyah*, chapter 8, subsection 4, and 5.

Al-Suri's argument is that the *tanzims*, the traditional secret organisations so typical for jihadist activities in the past, have outlived their relevance. Their dependency on sanctuaries in friendly states can no longer be counted upon in a unipolar world order and the increasing international cooperation against terrorism. Furthermore, their hierarchical structure means that if one member is caught, the whole organisation is at peril. Finally, the progressive Western occupation and usurpation of Muslim land (Palestine, Saudi-Arabia, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc) obligates a reorientation. The current war must be aimed at 'repelling the invading intruders and assailants' from Muslim lands. One has to postpone the traditional goal of an Islamic revolution in one country or one geographical area.

Al-Suri's slogan is: *nizam, la tanzim*, 'System, not organisation'. In other words, there should be 'an operative system' or template, available anywhere for anybody, wishing to participate in the global jihad either on his own or with a small group of trusted associates, and there should not exist any 'organisation for operations'. Hence, the global jihadist movement should discourage any direct organisational bonds between the leadership and the operative units. Leadership should only be exercised through 'general guidance' and the operative leaders should exist only at the level of small cells. The glue in this highly decentralised movement is nothing else than 'a common aim, a common doctrinal program and a comprehensive (self-) educational program'.

The same goal of decentralisation is applied to financing and training. All cells should be self-sustained financially, with the possible exception of start-up money from jihadist activists termed 'cell builders'. The latter category include skilled jihadists whose primary task is to create new independent cells, without connecting them to any organisational structure. The 'cell builder' is an Achilles heel in the system, and various precautions are taken to minimize the risk associated with his role. He is supposed to disappear from the scene before any operative activity commences, either by going to another country, going completely underground, or participating in a martyrdom operation.

The concept of individualised terrorism is developed in tandem with the benefits accruing from participation at the various 'open fronts' which serve not only as recruitment tools on their own, but also provide valuable training grounds for members of future independent cells. The individualised terrorism concept also relies on a total de-territorialisation of jihadist warfare, in which the importance of geographical distance is minimised. The aim of resisting the occupation should be applied through 'striking against it in every place', not simply within the confines of the traditional theatre of war. The entire globe has become the theatre of war. Hence, al-Suri appeals to his audience, especially his European- and US-based recruits, to begin the jihad at home, and he defines a long list of legitimate targets of attacks to be found in most any Western or Arab city. Despite the wide definition of legitimate targets, al-Suri strongly cautions against operations in which many ordinary Muslims, or non-hostile non-Muslims, are killed. Such attacks will play into the hands of the Crusaders, and undermine efforts at mobilising the Islamic umma behind the jihadist call. The slogan is: "The resistance

is the Islamic nation's battle and not a struggle of an elite", a clear antithesis to the avant-garde thinking of previous jihadist organisations, who gave top priority to capturing power in one country.

5.9 Concluding Remarks

The biography of Abu Mus'ab al-Suri provides insight into the rich and multi-faceted history of the global jihadist movement, and the different roles played by key principals such as al-Suri. These are people who have been in the game for several decades and have amassed tremendous experience and insights, which are now being translated into a lessons-learned oriented literature. Al-Suri represents a very important strain in contemporary jihadism, where there is a significant willingness to admit mistakes, learn from the past and rationally assess strengths and weaknesses in order to rebuild the jihadist movement on a new basis. This 'jihadi strategic studies' literature will become critical in months and years ahead, when the remaining 'classic al-Qaida' leaders are killed, arrested, or detained incommunicado. A decisive element in the future of jihadist terrorism is the degree to which skills, experience and insight from the old guard are being transferred to a younger generation of jihadists who have never been to Afghanistan and never met bin Ladin. Al-Suri has, unfortunately, contributed greatly to this transfer, and has formulated concepts and ideas with appeal to the more intellectually minded al-Qaida sympathisers. By his scientific and rational approach to jihadist warfare, his writings have the potential of attracting new segments into the al-Qaida orbit.

6 JIHADIST REACTIONS TO THE MUHAMMAD CARTOONS

By Truls H. Tønnessen, Consultant

6.1 Introduction

The publication of 12 caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad in the Danish newspaper *Jyllandposten* has sparked massive protests throughout the Islamic world. In several countries, Danish and Norwegian properties and symbols have been attacked by mobs, and Danish products are boycotted in several Muslim countries. A closer look at how the jihadist community has reacted to the caricatures indicates that the conflict is about a lot more than the cartoons themselves. A closer reading also reveals that within the jihadist circles there is disagreement concerning how best to deal with this conflict, and how it should be best approached. There is broad agreement that the caricatures are a horrifying insult against the entire Islamic world, and a crime that ought to be punished in one way or another. Some of the jihadists are more concerned with how to punish the countries in which the cartoons have been published, while other jihadists deem it more important to target the US-led “Crusader Alliance” which occupies Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. Others again are of the opinion that it is the weakness of the international Muslim community that led to the publishing of the caricatures, and direct their critique inwards instead of targeting the West.

I have chosen to divide this article in three “levels”. The first level constitutes the ideologues, who either are influential religious scholars within jihadist circles, or important writers from the same milieu. The next level is organized groups, such as Iraqi insurgent groups or Palestinian resistance groups. The third level is made up of what I term “jihadist activists”, who are the active participants on the jihadist internet forum *al-Hisba*. The most important discussion is found in the first and the third levels, and this makes the group level less important in this context.

6.2 Background

The caricatures were first published in the Danish newspaper *Jyllandposten* on 30 September 2005, and received some attention from the jihadist activists at that time. The cartoons were depicted as a “Crusade against Islam”, and the activists demanded punitive actions against the instigators.⁴⁶ However, the interest did not last very long and by mid-October, the whole affair seemed to be entirely forgotten.

⁴⁶ Al-Barqawi 250, “A Danish Newspaper Draws the Prophet (PBUH),” *al-Hisba* posted 8 October 2005 <http://www.alhesbah.com/v/showthread.php?t=35089> accessed 10 October 2005; and Abu Hamdan, “Danish Newspaper Insults the Prophet Muhammad,” *al-Hisba* posted 7 October 2005. <http://www.alhesbah.com/v/showthread.php?t=34919> accessed 2 February 2006.

Then, by January, there was a formidable rise of postings on the al-Hisba forum regarding the caricatures. Two developments were behind this sudden rise. First, and most importantly, was the “internationalization” of the conflict. A delegation of Danish imams toured the Middle East in order to bring the issue to attention of Muslim and Arab leaders. The stated reason behind the tour was that the Danish Premier Anders Fogh Rasmussen had refused to meet with a delegation of Muslim diplomats and to apologize, as the ambassadors of eleven Muslim countries had demanded in a letter sent to him on 12 October 2005.⁴⁷ Therefore, prominent Danish imams decided to inform the rest of the Muslim world how disrespectfully the Muslims were treated in Denmark after the 9/11. They had with them on their trip some highly provocative images of the Prophet that had not originally been printed in Jyllandposten. The delegation later said that these pictures were included to illustrate how the West treated Muslims generally.⁴⁸

6.3 The Hypocrisy and the Decay of the West

The most common reaction, and not only among the jihadists, is to denounce the caricatures as an offensive crime against the entire Islamic world and to demand an apology from those responsible. This means not only the newspapers that have published the caricatures, but also their respective governments.

Another common reaction is to criticize the hypocritical application of freedom of speech in the West. For instance, the Kuwaiti salafi shaykh Hamid al-Ali has claimed that in the West it is permitted to mock Islam, while it is not permitted to mock or to voice suspicion about the Holocaust.⁴⁹ The same argument is set forth in a statement from “Muslims in British Prisons Concerning Denmark”, published by The Islamic Observation Centre in London. The statement is signed by Umar Mahmud Uthman Abu Umar better known as Abu Qatada, widely regarded as al-Qa‘idas spiritual leader in Europe. The letter argues that the Danish government will stand up against anti-semitism and defend the memory of Holocaust, while it cherish defamation of Islam.⁵⁰

The jihadists also see the caricatures as an example of the rotting and decaying Western culture. The number two in al-Qa‘ida, Ayman al-Zawahiri, lamented the West in a tape sent to al-Jazeera on March 4 2006, for not holding anything holy except the anti-semitism taboo, the

⁴⁷ Håkon Gundersen, “Karikaturene sett fra Kairo,” *Morgenbladet* 10-16 February 2006.

⁴⁸ Ayman Qenawi, “Danish Muslims “Internationalize” Anti-Prophet Cartoons,” *Islam Online* 18 November 2005 <http://islamonline.net/English/News/2005-11/18/article02.shtml>; and Tore Gjerstad, Veslemøy Lode, “En ytterliggående dansk imam startet muslimopprøret,” *Dagbladet* 10 February 2006, <http://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/2006/02/10/457390.html>.

⁴⁹ Hamid al-Ali, “Is the Apology Sufficient?”, undated, www.h-alali.info/mpage/fatwa_open.php?cat=&id=14776. For English translation see “A Fatwa from Sheikh Hamed al-Ali Responding to the Apology of the Danish Newspaper of Publishing Caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad,” *SITE Institute* 2 February 2006.

⁵⁰ Qudsuk, “Important Statment From Inside British Prisons About Supporting Allah’s Messenger and the Islamic Religion,” *al-Hisba* posted 1 February 2006 <http://www.alhesbah.com/v/showthread.php?t=50777> accessed 1 February 2006. For English translation see “A Statement from the Muslims in British Prisons Signed by Abu Qatada Concerning Denmark”, *SITE Institute* 1 February 2006.

Holocaust and homosexuality. Al-Zawahiri mentioned several other examples, such as the Salman Rushdie affair, the ban against wearing *hijab* in France, and the torture in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. For Zawahiri, these examples show that the Western talk of free speech, justice and human rights is doubletalk.⁵¹ Several of the jihadists that are active on internet forums also denounce the entire Western culture, and promote the idea of an insurmountable chasm between the West and the Islamic world.⁵² The administrator of the al-Hisba forum also issued a statement concerning the caricatures, denouncing the perpetrators and the respective governments as drunkards and bisexuals.⁵³

6.4 The Weakness of the Islamic Umma

Not every jihadist directs the brunt of their attack against the West. Rather, it is the weakness of the Muslim community that led to the publishing of the caricatures. Therefore it is incumbent to address important problems inside the Muslim world. For instance, Abu Maria al-Qorashi, from the Global Islamic Media Front (one of the most active al-Qa'ida media outlets), complains that many Muslims that remain passive and al-Qorashi urges them to participate in jihad – with money, the pen, etc. He also criticizes Arab governments for only pretending to be Muslims.⁵⁴

Al-Qorashi is not alone in targeting the “near enemy”, the Muslim countries, and to deal with internal problems instead of diverting anger towards Denmark. Another publication from the Global Islamic Media Front, signed by Bakr bin Salim al-Bakri, is highly illustrative. Al-Bakri depicts the cartoons just as one of many offences against the Muslims. Therefore, al-Bakri urges his fellow Muslims to be less concerned with the Danish caricatures and be more concerned with Muslim states that do not govern according to the laws of Islam and instead apply British and French laws. Al-Bakri also blames the media in the Muslim countries for mocking the Prophet every day. He directs critique against religious scholars whom he denounces as “modernist shayks”, who overstate the Prophet’s tolerance for “the enemies”. He also directs harsh critique against religious scholars working for the state, and following their apostate laws. He implores them to tell the truth instead of saying what the state wants them to say. These religious scholars are willing to accept the Danish apology, as this will benefit the interests of the state. But according to al-Bakri, the shaykhs should place the interests of the religion and the Islamic *umma* above the worldly, local and personal interests. According to al-Bakri, this is the way to enlighten the people, and to waken them from their slumber. Husayn bin Mahmoud, a leading jihadist writer and cleric, also directs some of his ire against the regimes in the Arab world which he denounces as hypocrites. According to bin Mahmoud the

⁵¹ “A Tape from Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri Condemning West States for Policies Against Islam and Cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, and Advises Hamas Regarding Treaties and the Importance of Continued Jihad in Palestine,” *Site Institute* 5 March 2006.

⁵² Rayat al-Khayr, “No Use for Denmark and Norway, Except for the Likes of Muhammad Bouyeri,” *al-Hisba* posted 23 January 2006, <http://www.alhesbah.com/v/showthread.php?t=49245>, accessed 23 January 2006.

⁵³ Idarat Shabakat al-Hisba, “Bayan 4 min Shabakat al-Hisba, Condemnation of the base and provoking crime against the Prophet,” *al-Hisba* posted 26 January 2006, <http://www.alhesbah.org/v/showthread.php?t=49997> accessed 31 January 2006.

⁵⁴ “The Global Islamic Media Front Presents an Article: What after the Denmark Happenings...A Work Plan,” *SITE Institute* 10 February 2006.

Arab regimes criticize the cartoons while they are supporting Bush and Blair in occupying Iraq and killing Muslims.

Just as several of the ideologues do, some of the jihadist activists on the internet also direct their critique against the Arab regimes instead of against Denmark. However, it is important to note that this view is rarer amongst the jihadist activists than amongst the ideologues.

6.5 Boycott of Denmark or Boycott of the Crusading Alliance?

The most common reaction, and not only among the jihadists, is to denounce the caricatures as an offensive crime against the entire Islamic world and to demand an apology from “the responsible”, which in practice means the newspapers that have printed the cartoons and their respective governments. Economic boycott is the most common strategy to achieve this apology, and also to punish Denmark for its actions. It is important to notice that not everyone in the jihadist milieu advocates violence, as long as other means are available. For instance, Hamid al-Ali stated in a fatwa concerning the apology from Jyllandposten, that the punishment for mocking the Prophet is death, but boycott is a viable alternative for the Muslim masses. However, al-Ali did not deem the apology from Jyllandposten sufficient to end the boycott. He gave some minimum conditions to end the boycott: The perpetrators and the countries that support them, must apology to the whole Islamic world. They must promise not to repeat the crime, and to respect Islam. In a later fatwa, al-Ali decreed that Muslims who abstain from the boycott ought to be punished, as they are weakening the total power of the Muslim community.⁵⁵

The debate on how to use the boycott weapon is highly illustrative of the multifaceted reactions to the cartoons. An important line of demarcation runs between those who are chiefly concerned with punishing Denmark and those who are more concerned about the US-led “Crusader Alliance”. The latter depict the cartoon as an example of how the Crusader States are attacking and mocking Islam. In this context, Denmark is not the most important target. It is more important to challenge the whole Crusader Alliance and especially the leader of this alliance, the US. A case in point is the publication by the Global Islamic Media Front signed by Bakr ibn Salim al-Bakri. For him, worse than the Danish cartoons, is the fact that the US is using the holy land of Saudi Arabia as a base for targeting civilian Muslims in Iraq. This demarcation line also applies to the discussion regarding boycott.

As we have seen Hamid al-Ali wanted to target every country that published the cartoons with an economic boycott. Husayn bin Mahmoud stresses that Denmark should be the primary target. He warns the Muslims not to be fooled by the devilish plan of the West, which is to print the caricatures in several European countries in order to lighten the pressure on Denmark. The boycott should not end until Denmark “is eliminated from the globe” and the word

⁵⁵ Hamid al-Ali, “Is the Apology Sufficient?”, www.h-alali.info/npage/fatwa_open.php?cat=&id=14776. For English translation see “A Fatwa from Sheikh Hamed al-Ali Responding to the Apology of the Danish Newspaper of Publishing Caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad,” *SITE Institute* 2 February 2006.

“Denmark” no longer exists in Muslim dictionaries, he writes.⁵⁶ And the jihadist supporters that are active on the internet have devoted much space to the issue of which products to boycott, and have compiled extensive lists covering Danish and Norwegian products. One popular list designated four types of boycott. The first was the boycott of Danish companies and businessmen, such as the psychiatric firm Lundbeck (which have offices in Saudi-Arabia and Egypt), and also the boycott of local companies that cooperated with Danish companies, such as The Saudi Chemical Company and the Kuwaiti Danish Dairy Company. The next category was the boycott of Danish staple products such as Lurpak, Nido, etc. Even the French “Sofi de France” should be boycotted since they produce Danish pastries. The third kind of boycott was the boycott of all Danish athletic clubs. Coaches, players, masseurs or sports medicine specialists from Denmark should all be avoided. Meetings with any Danish athletic teams should also be avoided. The fourth and last category was the boycott of products for women. A long list with pictures of beauty products and Danish staple products to be avoided was attached to the posting.⁵⁷

When the Norwegian “Magazinet” reprinted the caricatures, the word spread on the al-Hisba forum and participants asked if someone was willing to gather information about Norwegian products to boycott.⁵⁸ The list covering Norwegian products that should be boycotted hints that the participants on al-Hisba don’t know Norwegian society very well. The choice of companies to boycott seems to be randomly picked, like the soccer team Brann, the Student Welfare Association of the University of Bergen, and a well-known restaurant in Oslo called Palace Grill. Also, more economically important firms, such as Hydro and Tine, figure on the list while Jotun, a Norwegian producer of paint which is heavily represented in the Middle East, is not on the list.⁵⁹ This indicates that the members do not have inside knowledge of Danish and Norwegian society, and may suggest that the members generally do not reside in Europe. However, a recently published study of the readership distribution of the al-Hisba forum alleges that while 29% of the readers are based in the Gulf, as many as 22% are based in Europe.⁶⁰ These numbers do not measure where the *active* members of the forum are based. Furthermore, some postings do reveal indirect knowledge of Danish and Norwegian society. For instance, one participant of the forum mentions Annemette Hommel, the Danish officer who was accused of torturing Iraqi prisoners during interrogation.⁶¹ Another participant posted

⁵⁶ Husayn bin Mahmoud, “Nothing but Thoughts (3),” *al-Hisba* posted by Rooh 50 12 February 2006 <http://www.alhesbah.com/v/showthread.php?t=52181> , accessed 14 February 2006.

⁵⁷ Abu al-Hassan al-Azdi, “Denmark Will Kneel Weeping,” *al-Hisba* posted 21 January 2006, <http://www.alhesbah.com/v/showthread.php?t=48849> accessed 23 January 2006.

⁵⁸ Reply to (from al-Muthannan) Talib al-Firdaws, “Norwegian Magazine Prints the Insulting Drawings of the Prophet,” *al-Hisba* posted 27 January 2006, <http://www.alhesbah.com/v/showthread.php?t=49916> , accessed 27 January 2006.

⁵⁹ Abu Hassan al-Azdi, “Why Denmark Only? Norway as Well ‘Have Been Arrogant’, and Here is Norway’s Products,” *al-Hisba* posted 30 January 2006, <http://www.alhesbah.com/v/showthread.php?t=50439>, accessed 1 February 2006.

⁶⁰ “The Global Distribution of the Readers of al-Hesbah forum,” *Internet Haganah* 2 March 2006, <http://haganah.org.il/harchives/005497.html>.

⁶¹ Faris al-Andalus, “500 Danish pagans in Iraq, Who Will Stand up for the Prophet?” *al-Hisba* posted 21 February 2006, <http://www.al-hesbah.org/v/showthread.php?t=54389>, accessed 21 February 2006.

a clipping from an edition of the Norwegian satirical radio show “Hallo i Uken”, where they made fun of the whole cartoon affair.

As opposed to the focus on Denmark and Norway, some of the ideologues and some of the supporters want an economic boycott of the entire Crusader Alliance instead of singling out individual countries. A case in point is the aforementioned Bakr ibn Salim al-Bakri who saw the US as a bigger threat than Denmark. Accordingly, he wants to extend the boycott of Danish products to American products, emphasising that it is more important to boycott the American products. According to al-Bakri, it is incumbent on every Muslim to work for the destruction of the US, and one of the weapons every Muslim can use is boycott. The US should be boycotted until the entire Islamic *umma* is void of US interests. Several postings on the jihadist forums also deem it more important to boycott the US than Denmark and Norway.⁶² Al-Bakri still wants to boycott Denmark, but some of the activists that participate in the jihadist forums voice concerns that the boycott of Danish and Norwegian products will favour US products. Therefore one participant urges his brothers to buy products only from countries which do not contribute to the war in Iraq, for instance Germany.⁶³

This argument has been taken further by jihadists advocating a boycott of the entire West. For instance, the writer Husayn bin Mahmoud, sees this boycott as an occasion to get rid of the Western hegemony entirely. Therefore, he implores the Muslims to buy Muslim products and merchandise instead of those of the West. This will strengthen the Islamic world and weaken the Western world. In this way Mahmoud links the cartoons with an economic and political “independence war” against Western hegemony. Likewise, Hamid al-Ali has urged the foundation of a trade union consisting of the most influential Muslim businessmen. This trade union shall boycott every country that mocks the Prophet.

Also, some of the jihadists active on the forums regard the boycott as an economic tool to challenge the Western economic domination of the Islamic world. They therefore urge the boycott of both Europe and America, which are in need of the oil and fuel in the Islamic world. These participants tend to be more concerned with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan than with the cartoons.⁶⁴

6.6 Is an Economic Boycott Sufficient?

Ayman al-Zawahiri, in his tape from 9 March 2006, defines the first front of action as the boycott of Western products, together with attacks directed against the West. Yet others have argued that an economic boycott is not sufficient, and can even have damaging consequences.

⁶² See for instance, Akhir Fursa, reply to Abu Hamza 2005, “Our Shaykh Abu Bilal Leads Heavy Attack against Denmark,” *al-Hisba* posted 30 January 2006, <http://www.alhesbah.com/v/showthread.php?t=50491>, accessed 1 February 2006 and Abu Bakr al-Iraqi reply to Abu Awis, “Pictures of Danish Forces in Iraq”, *al-Hisba* posted 30 January 2006, accessed 1 February 2006.

⁶³ Mansur al-Shami, reply to Abu Azzam 99, “List and Pictures of Danish Products to be Boycotted by all” *al-Hisba* posted 27 January 2006, <http://www.alhesbah.com/v/showthread.php?t=49808>, accessed 27 January 2006.

⁶⁴ Abu Bakr al-Iraqi, “The Danish drawings... Is Not an Isolated Action, Rather a Phase of the Crusades,” *al-Hisba* posted 30 January 2006, accessed 1 February 2006.

The Iraqi Islamic resistance groups have stressed this. The Mujahidin Army, for instance, states clearly that “boycott of milk and cheese” is not sufficient. A military track should be pursued in addition to the boycott track. A previously unknown group called “Planning and Follow-Up Authority” (Hai’at al-Mutaba‘a wa al-takhtit) issued a statement where they claimed to have shot down “Christian planes” in Iraq. According to the statement, their intention was to show that the boycott should be abandoned in favour of an aggressive jihad. This group understands the cartoons in light of the Crusader campaign against the Muslims, in which the Vatican is involved. And the Iraqi Christian is part of this campaign, and therefore it is necessary to strike Christian targets in Iraq.⁶⁵

Interestingly, this communiqué sparked a discussion on the al-Hisba forum concerning the native Christians of Iraq. One participant called “Akrama al-Madani” blames the group for targeting innocent Iraqi Christians and asks how this will punish Denmark? Actions such as this will only have adverse effects on the Mujahidin in Iraq, and he refers to al-Maqdisi’s critique of al-Zarqawi concerning the killing of civilians in Iraq. Al-Madani wants instead to attack targets in Denmark or Danish soldiers in Iraq. The main subsequent discussion is whether the Christians in Iraq (as a group) are supporting the occupation or not.⁶⁶ In his most recent tape, Ayman Al-Zawahiri stresses that it is not sufficient to participate in protests and burnings of a few embassies and then return to normal. This is in accord with earlier statements from al-Zawahiri. Consider, for instance, his tape from May 2003, where he states that

‘Protests will not do you any good, neither will demonstrations or conferences. Nothing will do you good, but toting arms and taking revenge against your enemies, the Americans and the Jews. Demonstrations will not... protect your jeopardised holy places or expel an occupying enemy, nor will they deter an arrogant aggressor...The crusaders and the Jews do not understand but the language of killing and blood. They do not become convinced unless they see coffins returning to them, their interests being destroyed, their towers being torched, and their economy collapsing.’⁶⁷

6.7 Violent actions against Denmark or against the Crusader States

The same line of argument runs through the discussion about whether it is more important to avenge the Prophet by targeting Danish interests, or to challenge the larger Crusader Alliance.

⁶⁵ “A Statement from the Planning and Follow-Up Authority in Iraq Announcing Strikes Upon Christian Planes in Iraq as an Example of Revenge for Caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad,” *SITE Institute* 3 February 2006, <http://siteinstitute.org/bin/articles.cgi?ID=publications145106&Category=publications&Subcategory=0>

⁶⁶ Akrama al-Madani, “Concerning the communiqué from Ha’iat al-Mutaba‘a wa al-takhtit,” *al-Hisba* posted 31 January 2006, <http://www.alhesbah.com/v/showthread.php?t=50783>, accessed 27 February 2006.

⁶⁷ “al-Qaeda’ Statement: Full Text,” *BBC News* 21 May 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3047903.stm.

It seems to be that the vast majority of jihadist activists do agree on targeting Danish or Norwegian interests as retribution for the publication of the caricatures. Several of the jihadist ideologues have issued veiled calls for violent actions in order to avenge the Prophet. As already mentioned, Hamid al-Ali has said that the punishment for mocking the Prophet is death. Likewise, the letter signed by Abu Qatada who sees the cartoons as a good occasion for Muslims to prove themselves as good Muslims, and the letter ends with the following sentence: “Victory. Victory. The door to Paradise is opened. Congratulations to who is rushing to it”. In the same vein, `Attiyat Allah (in the introduction to his letter called “Muhammad, The Messenger of Allah”, reminds the readers of the destiny of another mocker of Islam, Theo Van Gogh.⁶⁸ The Dutch film director Van Gogh was killed in broad daylight in the middle of Amsterdam in November 2004 for his provocative film, “Submission”.⁶⁹ Several of the jihadist activists on the internet asked if this attack could be repeated in Denmark or Norway.⁷⁰ In particular, the editor of the Norwegian Christian publication “Magazinet”, Vebjørn Selbekk, who published the pictures in January 2006, and the Secretary-General of the Norwegian Press Association, Per Edgar Kokkvold, who defended the right of “Magazinet” to publish the pictures, have been singled out as targets. Apparently, the participants of the al-Hisba forum (and other forums as well), believe that those two individuals are responsible for the caricatures either as editors of the Danish Jyllandposten, or as the cartoonists.⁷¹

One of the most threatening postings is from the member called “Jihad1”. In his posting called “A Reply to Denmark,” he includes several pictures that are threatening attacks in Denmark. This is a reply to the apologies from the editor of the Jyllandposten. In a serious case like this, a feeble apology is not enough, he says. The pictures are meant to be the “real answer”, and threaten that the Danish are going to live in fear until their imminent punishment is fulfilled. The pictures have captions such as –“Boombing (sic) Soon in Denmark”, “I will bomb myself in DENMARK very soon as my brothers in Islam did in UK”, and “Denmark Is Next After UK and Sweden”.⁷² Several of these pictures first appeared on the internet in October 2005 and were signed by the “Glory Brigades in Northern Europe”.⁷³ This is an unknown group, but according to Internet Haganah (an US-based internet group monitoring extremist Islamic

⁶⁸ Shaykh Attiyat Allah, “Muhammad the Messenger of Allah,” (English Translation) *al-Hisba* posted 7 February 2006, <http://www.alhesbah.com/v/showthread.php?t=51927>, accessed 10 February 2006.

⁶⁹ For more on the Van Gogh case, see Petter Nesser, “The slaying of the dutch filmmaker - Religiously motivated violence or Islamist terrorism in the name of global jihad?” FFI/RAPPORT-2005/00376 <http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2005/00376.pdf>.

⁷⁰ Abu Hamdan, “Danish Newspaper Insults the Prophet Muhammad,” *al-Hisba* posted 7 October 2005, <http://www.alhesbah.com/v/showthread.php?t=34919>, accessed 2 February 2006.

⁷¹ See for instance, Abu al-Nasir al-Maghribi, “Pictures of the Despicable Edgar Kokkvold, the Man Who Made the Caricatures”, *al-Hisba* posted 24 January 2006, <http://www.alhesbah.com/v/showthread.php?t=49334>, accessed 27 January 2006.

⁷² Jihad1, “A Reply to Denmark,” *al-Hisba* posted 26 January 2006, <http://www.alhesbah.com/v/showthread.php?t=49650>, accessed 27 January 2006.

⁷³ “Temper Tantrum of the Day Award,” *Internet Haganah* 15 October 2005, <http://haganah.org.il/harchives/005186.html>; “The Danish Threat,” *Internet Haganah* 28 January 2006, <http://haganah.org.il/harchives/005437.html> and “Cartoons raise fears of terror attacks,” Ritzau via Denmark.dk 21 October 2005, http://www.denmark.dk/portal/page?_pageid=374,880218&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL.

websites), there are some resemblances between these pictures and the pictures from April 2005 that threatened Sweden.⁷⁴

However, there seems to be some disagreement as to which Danish targets are the most important to hit – targets inside Denmark or targets outside Denmark and especially in Iraq. Read in a bigger context – is it more important to punish Denmark for insulting the Prophet, or should the caricatures be seen as part of the battle between Islam and the West that currently unfolds itself especially in Iraq? Several of the jihadist activists wanted to attack targets inside Denmark, such as the office of Jyllandposten and several postings urged the mujahidin to attack inside Denmark.⁷⁵ However, the Danish military presence in Iraq was also cited as a pretext for attacking Denmark and for some of the participants this was a more important reason than the cartoons. For instance, one posting gives a list of countries to hit: America, Italy, Denmark, their embassies and interests abroad, and their forces in Iraq.⁷⁶ In other words, the poster wants to target countries with military presence in Iraq. Others urged the Mujahidin in Iraq to kidnap Danes in Iraq and chop their heads off as revenge.⁷⁷ Pictures of Danish forces in Iraq have been distributed on the forum, apparently in order to make them easier to spot for the mujahidin in Iraq⁷⁸

6.8 Which Groups Have Threatened with Violence?

Several militant Islamic groups have strongly denounced the cartoons, and threatened retribution against Danish and Norwegian targets. Interestingly, the more radical Islamic groups, such as Hamas or al-Qa`ida in Iraq, have been remarkably silent on the cartoons. Instead, it is the more “quasi-Islamic” nationalist groups that have threatened attacks. This indicates that the Muhammad cartoons are a highly symbolic case, and a case that groups employ to bolster their images as an Islamic group. The “purer” Islamic groups already have a reputation as Islamic groups, and are not so much in need of proving their credentials. This may also explain why the response from the Islamic groups lacks the discussion of the ideologues and the supporters.

A case in point is the Iraqi insurgent group “Islamic Army in Iraq” (*al-Jaish al-Islami fi'l-‘Iraq* or IAI). IAI was founded by elements from the former regime in 2003, but there are indications that more radical Iraqi Islamists joined the group at a later stage.⁷⁹ This has resulted

⁷⁴ “The Swedish Threat,” *Internet Haganah* 29 April 2005, <http://haganah.org.il/harchives/004053.html>.

⁷⁵ For instance, participant “Tarif” in reply to al-Sahara’s posting 27 January 2006 and Mokawama, “Aim Your Hits on the Infidels of Denmark, O Mujahidin”, *al-Hisba* posted 31 January 2006, www.alhesbah.com/v/showthread.php?t=50698, accessed 1 February 2006.

⁷⁶ Ansar al-Haqq, “After Insulting the Prophet and Their Forces in Iraq...Will the Next Attack Happen in Denmark?”, *al-Hisba* posted 31 January 2006 <http://www.alhesbah.com/v/showthread.php?t=50743>, accessed 31 January 2006

⁷⁷ Abu Basir al-Sahli reply to Abu Azzam 99, “List and Pictures of Danish products to be boycotted by all” *al-Hisba* posted 27 January 2006, <http://www.alhesbah.com/v/showthread.php?t=49808>, accessed 27 January 2006.

⁷⁸ For instance participant “Abu Basir al-Sahli” in reply to al-Sahara’s posting 27 January 2006 and Abu Awis, “Pictures of Danish Forces in Iraq”, *al-Hisba* posted 30 January 2006, <http://www.alhesbah.com/v/showthread.php?t=50520>, accessed 1 February 2006.

⁷⁹ “Four Iraqi Movements,” *Intelligence Online* (Paris) 10 September 2004, via FBIS; Patrick Forestier, “Tracking Down Hostage Takers,” *Paris Match* 16-22 September 2004, p.52-53, via FBIS; and Mouna Naim and Jean-

in a power struggle between the moderates and the more radical faction. This struggle was apparent in the negotiations between IAI and France, concerning the release of the two French journalists Georges Malbrunot and Christian Chesnot in late 2004.⁸⁰ IAI issued a very aggressive statement concerning the caricatures where they called upon Muslims to capture Danes as hostages, and to cut them into small pieces. IAI says it will not spare any Danish and Norwegian citizen in Iraq, even if they are civilian. As several others have done, IAI depicts the cartoons as evidence of the US-led Crusader War against Muslims. Every country that publishes the caricatures should be targeted and Muslim states and civilians ought to break off all relations with them. IAI also stresses that this is a good occasion for Muslims to prove themselves as good Muslims, and everyone should participate in the struggle against the aggressors according to his own ability. The IAI statement can be interpreted as an outcome of the competition between the moderates and radicals inside the group. It is perhaps even more relevant to situate the statement in the larger context of the Iraqi insurgency. IAI clearly wants to show to the world, and to Iraq especially, that it is an Islamic group and not a front for Ba‘thist supporters.⁸¹

The same goes for the one other Iraqi Islamic resistance group that has issued a statement on the Muhammad cartoons, The Mujahidin Army (*Jaysh al-Mujahidin*). In their statement posted on their website and dated 29 January 2006, they interpret the cartoons as a sign of the latent hate towards Islam in Denmark and Norway.⁸² In retribution, they urged all their brigades to attack as much as they can Norwegian and Danish targets, and everyone that follows their steps.⁸³ It is important to notice that they only ask their own brigades to attack Norwegian and Danish targets. As far as we know, the Mujahidin Army does not have detachments outside Iraq, and therefore it is likely that they refer to targets inside Iraq. As with the IAI, the Mujahidin Army has roots within the former regime, but is apparently a smaller organization than the IAI. The same phenomenon can be seen in Palestine, where the Islamic group Hamas reportedly not instigated or led violent actions in response to the cartoons, whereas pro-Fatah groups and Fatah defectors have issued very specific threats.

6.9 The Potential for Mobilisation

A pertinent question is how the cartoon conflict could be employed in the mobilization of Muslims to join jihadist cells or groups. The jihadists themselves stress that the caricatures can have positive effects on the Islamic community. For instance, Attiyat Allah is convinced that the whole affair will lead to more converts to Islam, not only in Denmark, but also in

Pierre Stroobants, “Kidnappers’ Group Said To Include ‘Wahhabite’ Activists,” *Le Monde* 31 August 2004, via FBIS.

⁸⁰ “French weekly says France in direct contact with Iraqi kidnappers” (FBIS-title), *Europe 1 Radio* (Paris) 1 September 2004 1600 GMT, via FBIS; and Adrien Jaulmes, “Negotiations Depend on Intermediaries,” *Le Figaro* 2 September 2004, via FBIS.

⁸¹ “The Islamic Army in Iraq Issues a Statement Threatening Countries that Had Published Within Them Caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad,” *SITE Institute* 7 February 2006.

⁸² At that time other European countries had not yet published the drawings.

⁸³ Jaysh al-Mujahidin, “The Misdeed against the Prophet (PBUH),” <http://www.jaishalmugahideen.net/news.php?action=view&id=90&f240085c7683fbde4388499771ca2f4e>, accessed 31 January 2006.

Scandinavia and in the rest of Europe, if Muslims use this occasion to spread the word of Islam (*al-da'wa*). The letter of Attiyat Allah is trying to convince non-Muslim believers to convert to Islam, and he urges his Islamic compatriots to translate the letter into Danish.⁸⁴ Husayn bin Mahmoud calls upon the Islamic community to utilise this case as a tool for mobilization. He urges Islamic scholars to use this incident to awaken the sleeping Muslims from their slumber, and to fill the mosques in Denmark with young Muslims.

According to the jihadists, the caricatures can also serve as an eye-opener for many Muslims. Earlier, some of the Muslims, especially those residing in the West, believed the Western hypocrisy of “respect for every religion,” etc. The cartoons have revealed the true face of the West and their hate towards the Muslims, and this will make it easier to mobilize Muslims to join the fight against the West.

The cartoons, in jihadist eyes, have also contributed to a revitalisation of the Muslim community and to the unification of the diverse trends within the Muslim community. According to Husayn bin Mahmoud, this is the first time that the shi'a-Muslims are chanting for the Prophet Muhammad instead of Husayn. Likewise, bin Mahmoud depicts the success of the economic boycott as a victory for the jihadists, as the boycott has affected several large Western trade companies.

On the other hand, this article has shown that the cartoons have given rise to internal debates and discussions within the jihadist community. The jihadists do not agree on whether it is more important to target Denmark or to target the larger Crusader Alliance. Likewise, they do not agree as to whether they should target the “near enemy”, the Muslim regimes, or the “far enemy” (the US-led Crusader Alliance). As such, the discussion about how to approach the cartoons is related to the larger discussion in the jihadist community.

6.10 Concluding Remarks

This paper has pointed out that the reactions to the Muhammad cartoons inside the jihadist community have not been unified. There have been reactions on several levels, from the top level (*al-Zawahiri*) to the lowest level (the jihadist activists on the internet). Inside the jihadist community there have been discussions as to how to interpret the conflict, and how best to deal with the caricatures. The lines of discussions were mainly twofold; should the jihadists focus their energies on attacking the perpetrators of the caricatures or should they instead target the Crusader Alliance. The second area of conflict was whether one should direct the anger outwards against the West, or inwards against the Muslim community itself.

⁸⁴ Shaykh Attiyat Allah, “Muhammad the Messenger of Allah,” (English Translation) *al-Hisba* posted 7 February 2006, <http://www.alhesbah.com/v/showthread.php?t=51927> accessed 10 February 2006.

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