Muslims, despite their suspect status for failing in ethnic Turkish quality, were considered to be easily assimilable elements to the Turkish identity.

Another major contribution of Çağaptay’s study is that although race was articulated into Kemalist nationalism in the 1930s, in High Kemalist parlance ‘race’ was not connoted to ‘immutable biological characteristics, passed down genetically’; rather, race marked ‘ethnicity-through-language’ (p. 157). This appeared in the integration of the Jewish minority into Turkish identity through the language. In exploring the defining characteristics of Kemalism in the 1920s and 1930s, Çağaptay seems to position himself in the middle between the orthodox Kemalists who defend Kemalist (civic) nationalism as an inclusive one embracing all elements who, deemed themselves as Turks regardless of their ethnic and religious origins; and the anti-Kemalists who underlined the exclusionary and racist colour of the republican order.

In this lucid and archive-based scholarly work, Çağaptay draws a tripartite-zone of Kemalist nationalism: territorial, religious and ethno-religious (if not racist). These zones have determined the status of one’s relation to the state: the ones—Jews and the Christians—who are located in the third, territorial zone are loosely articulated into Turkishness; in the middle there are non-Turkish Muslims including the Kurds, Circassians, Muslim Georgians, Lazes and the like; and the first, the ethnic zone marks the Turkish heartland: residing in this zone gives one a privileged status among other Turks.

In the last decade a historical turn emerged in the scholarship of Turkish politics for illuminating the neglected, less-elaborated and even distorted points of the foundational years of modern Turkey. Although the basic motive of this historical turn, which is anti-Kemalist in spirit, is to challenge the basic assumptions of Kemalism, the founding ideology of modern Turkey, some scholars including Soner Çağaptay do not express a harsh challenge toward the Kemalist foundations; instead they negotiate between the established knowledge and the emergent one. Yet they all present rich historical findings that have shaped the political culture of Turkey today.

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Middle East Technical University-Turkey

Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia supports the new Global Terrorism
Dore Gold

Hatred’s Kingdom sets out to answer the following question: What larger forces drove the perpetrators to undertake the most lethal terrorist attack in America’s history? The hypothesis: Islamist terrorism is driven by an ‘ideology of hatred’ known as Wahhabism which thrives on the active support of the Saudi state.

The author of this overtly polemical book is Dore Gold, a Columbia PhD who has served as Israeli ambassador to the UN and foreign policy advisor to both Benyamin Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon. Gold begins his argument by rightly pointing out that the ideological dimension of violent Islamism is poorly understood, and that there is a tendency to focus on operational aspects of terrorism or on simplified structural or political explanations. In order to
understand how and why terrorism has come to afflict the West, Gold writes, we must delve deeper into the Saudi system and examine Wahhabism.

_Hatred’s Kingdom_ is essentially a brief history of Saudi Arabia with a particular focus on the role of Wahhabi ideology and discourse in motivating violence committed by the Saudi state, its internal enemies or its proxies. The book’s eleven chapters take the reader in chronological order from the birth of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (the eighteenth century intellectual father of Wahhabism) to the recent terrorist campaign in Saudi Arabia. In the first seven chapters, Gold summarizes the secondary literature on Saudi history in a relatively uncontroversial historical overview. In the final four chapters, Gold attempts to make a more original contribution by using primary sources to document the Saudi state’s promotion of Wahhabism abroad, its spread of intolerant religious literature, and its direct support for Muslim militants in places such as Bosnia and Palestine.

Gold argues that Saudi Wahhabism has motivated violence and terrible atrocities throughout its history, as evidenced by the expansionist wars of the first Saudi state, the Ikhwan rebellion in the 1920s and King Faisal’s sheltering of Muslim Brotherhood activists in the 1960s and 1970s. The Saudi regime later became a backer of what he calls ‘Wahhabism’s international terror network’ in order to boost its geostrategic position and to ensure the support of the Wahhabi establishment in the impending struggles for succession. Gold asserts that there is ample evidence of Saudi state support for terrorist activities and argues that something must be done to compel the Saudis to obey international law.

_Hatred’s Kingdom_ makes no secret of its polemical stance and deliberately political message. Let us therefore state with equal frankness that the scientific value of this book is very limited, and that it would not normally merit a critical review in an academic journal, were it not for the fact that it reached the New York Times’ bestseller list and was described as ‘superb’ by former CIA director R. James Woolsey.

Dore Gold is most convincing when he is kicking open doors, such as documenting the well-known Saudi support for Hamas and the government’s massive funding of guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan and Bosnia in the 1980s and early 1990s. While Saudi support for Hamas probably continues, Saudi government officials such as Adil al-Jubayr have expressed regret over past policies which encouraged or allowed youths to fight in foreign conflicts. Similarly, saying that Saudi schoolbooks promoted intolerance and prejudice toward non-Muslims for too long is neither particularly new nor controversial—the argument has been made publicly and forcefully by Saudi Islamists such as Abd al-Aziz al-Qasim.

Gold is much less convincing when he attempts to portray Wahhabism as a monolithic and destructive force which underlies all Islamist terrorism. This ignores the role played by Islamist currents other than Wahhabism—and by countries other than Saudi Arabia—in the emergence of contemporary radical Islamism. The first modern Islamist terrorist groups emerged in Egypt and Syria, not Saudi Arabia. The Arab participation in the 1980s Afghan war was initiated and managed not by Wahhabi activists but by the Muslim Brotherhood.

Gold is also on thin ice when he tries to prove direct Saudi state support to terrorist groups other than Hamas. In the conclusion (p 243), Gold cites four main points from the ‘ample evidence’ of Saudi support for terrorism. First are ‘its ties
in the 1960s with the Fatah movement; second is the support for Hamas in the 1990s; third is the ‘Saudi money backing Islamic oppositions’ in Egypt and Algeria and fourth is the ‘considerable circumstantial evidence that the Saudis struck a Faustian bargain with Osama bin Laden in 1995–1996’. The final claim is disputed by the 9/11 report, the third point is extremely vague, while the first two concern Saudi support for Palestinian militancy. Unless you believe that Hamas and al-Qaida have close links—as Dore Gold has argued on numerous occasions—this is hardly a case for Saudi official complicity to the 9/11 attacks.

The least flattering aspect of Dore Gold’s book is the highly polemical, normative and sensationalist style in which it is written. Guilt by association seems to be the book’s bearing principle. Few distinctions are made between the Saudi government, private Saudi donors, the religious establishment and the most hardline scholars. Similarly, Gold rarely makes a distinction between Hamas, al-Qaida and the Chechen or Bosnian Mujahideen—it is all part of what he calls ‘Wahhabism’s international terror network’.

The main problem with the book is that its propagandistic style detracts the reader’s attention from the genuinely interesting questions that it raises. What explains the absence of a sizeable violent Saudi Islamist community between 1930 and 1985? Why were there so many Saudi radicals yet little domestic terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s? Why do some Saudis become militants while others do not?

Hatred’s Kingdom is perhaps most interesting as an historical document in its own right, which serves as a reminder of the profound effects of the 9/11 terrorist atrocity on US political culture. It stands as a superb illustration of the way in which basic principles of scientific judgement and previously held standards for political correctness were suspended in a furious search for a simple answer to the frustratingly complex question: what caused 9/11?

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